Breaking the Prompt Wall (I): A Real-World Case Study of Attacking ChatGPT via Lightweight Prompt Injection
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
This report presents a real-world case study demonstrating how prompt injection can attack large language model platforms such as ChatGPT according to a proposed injection framework. By providing three real-world examples, we show how adversarial prompts can be injected via user inputs, web-based retrieval, and system-level agent instructions. These attacks, though lightweight and low-cost, can cause persistent and misleading behaviors in LLM outputs. Our case study reveals that even commercial-grade LLMs remain vulnerable to subtle manipulations that bypass safety filters and influence user decisions. textbfMore importantly, we stress that this report is not intended as an attack guide, but as a technical alert. As ethical researchers, we aim to raise awareness and call upon developers, especially those at OpenAI, to treat prompt-level security as a critical design priority.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 9 of its 12 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Apr 2025.
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9 of 12 references.
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Other references · 8
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysiscited by 30
- 2026Provably Secure Agent Guardrailcited by 0
- 2026Provably Secure Agent Guardrail28 May 2026
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis11 Feb 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2024An Early Categorization of Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models
- 2023Assessing Prompt Injection Risks in 200+ Custom GPTs
- 2025ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- 2023Ignore This Title and HackAPrompt: Exposing Systemic Vulnerabilities of LLMs through a Global Scale Prompt Hacking Competition
- 2025When AI Meets the Web: Prompt Injection Risks in Third-Party AI Chatbot Plugins
- 2024Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models
- 2025Bypassing Prompt Guards in Production with Controlled-Release Prompting
- 2025A Critical Evaluation of Defenses against Prompt Injection Attacks