mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Efficient Safety Retrofitting Against Jailbreaking for LLMs

arXiv 2502.13603 ↗First posted 19 Feb 2025cs.CL cs.AI cs.LGcited by 4

On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks

also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is an efficient alignment technique that steers LLMs towards preferable outputs by training on preference data, bypassing the need for explicit reward models. Its simplicity enables easy adaptation to various domains and safety requirements. This paper examines DPO's effectiveness in model safety against jailbreaking attacks while minimizing data requirements and training costs. We introduce Egida, a dataset expanded from multiple sources, which includes 27 different safety topics and 18 different attack styles, complemented with synthetic and human labels. This data is used to boost the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs (Llama-3.1-8B/70B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-7B/72B-Instruct) across topics and attack styles. In addition to safety evaluations, we assess their post-alignment performance degradation in general purpose tasks, and their tendency to over refusal. Following the proposed methodology, trained models reduce their Attack Success Rate by 10%-30%, using small training efforts (2,000 samples) with low computational cost (3 for 8B models, 20 for 72B models). Safety aligned models generalize to unseen topics and attack styles, with the most successful attack style reaching a success rate around 5%. Size and family are found to strongly influence model malleability towards safety, pointing at the importance of pre-training choices. To validate our findings, a large independent assessment of human preference agreement with Llama-Guard-3-8B is conducted by the authors and the associated dataset Egida-HSafe is released. Overall, this study illustrates how affordable and accessible it is to enhance LLM safety using DPO while outlining its current limitations. All datasets and models are released to enable reproducibility and further research.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 48 of its 61 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Feb 2025.

Builds on

48 of 61 references.

Closest ancestors · 5

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024Mission Impossible: A Statistical Perspective on Jailbreaking LLMs2 Aug
  2. 2024Adversarial DPO: Harnessing Harmful Data for Reducing Toxicity with Minimal Impact on Coherence and Evasiveness in Dialogue Agents21 May
  3. 2024Configurable Safety Tuning of Language Models with Synthetic Preference Data30 Mar
  4. 2023Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations10 Oct
  5. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul

Other references · 43

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
  2. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
  3. 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 8,065
  4. 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,963
  5. 2023Efficient Memory Management for Large Language Model Serving with PagedAttentioncited by 5,944
  6. 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,912
  7. 2020Learning to summarize from human feedbackcited by 2,588
  8. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
  9. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
  10. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,420
  11. 2019Energy and Policy Considerations for Deep Learning in NLPcited by 1,254
  12. 2024Tulu 3: Pushing Frontiers in Open Language Model Post-Trainingcited by 1,053
31 more
  1. 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Modelscited by 1,026
  2. 2024SimPO: Simple Preference Optimization with a Reference-Free Rewardcited by 963
  3. 2024Yi: Open Foundation Models by 01.AIcited by 719
  4. 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 672
  5. 2024ORPO: Monolithic Preference Optimization without Reference Modelcited by 562
  6. 2023GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Promptscited by 560
  7. 2023Promptbreeder: Self-Referential Self-Improvement Via Prompt Evolutioncited by 551
  8. 2023Zephyr: Direct Distillation of LM Alignmentcited by 506
  9. 2023Catastrophic Jailbreak of Open-source LLMs via Exploiting Generationcited by 451
  10. 2023Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructionscited by 387
  11. 2023DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreakercited by 367
  12. 2023A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easilycited by 259
  13. 2022Is Reinforcement Learning (Not) for Natural Language Processing: Benchmarks, Baselines, and Building Blocks for Natural Language Policy Optimizationcited by 246
  14. 2024Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 230
  15. 2024Rainbow Teaming: Open-Ended Generation of Diverse Adversarial Promptscited by 205
  16. 2024Disentangling Length from Quality in Direct Preference Optimizationcited by 196
  17. 2022On Second Thought, Let's Not Think Step by Step! Bias and Toxicity in Zero-Shot Reasoningcited by 194
  18. 2023Do-Not-Answer: A Dataset for Evaluating Safeguards in LLMscited by 184
  19. 2023MasterKey: Automated Jailbreak Across Multiple Large Language Model Chatbotscited by 183
  20. 2024Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimization in Direct Alignment Algorithmscited by 143
  21. 2024ALERT: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Assessing Large Language Models' Safety through Red Teamingcited by 98
  22. 2024Does Refusal Training in LLMs Generalize to the Past Tense?cited by 79
  23. 2023SimpleSafetyTests: a Test Suite for Identifying Critical Safety Risks in Large Language Modelscited by 76
  24. 2024Towards Analyzing and Understanding the Limitations of DPO: A Theoretical Perspectivecited by 69
  25. 2024SG-Bench: Evaluating LLM Safety Generalization Across Diverse Tasks and Prompt Typescited by 60
  26. 2024Enhancing LLM Safety via Constrained Direct Preference Optimizationcited by 49
  27. 2024RS-DPO: A Hybrid Rejection Sampling and Direct Preference Optimization Method for Alignment of Large Language Modelscited by 48
  28. 2024Insights into Alignment: Evaluating DPO and its Variants Across Multiple Taskscited by 35
  29. 2024Red Teaming GPT-4V: Are GPT-4V Safe Against Uni/Multi-Modal Jailbreak Attacks?cited by 34
  30. 2024Tradeoffs Between Alignment and Helpfulness in Language Models with Steering Methodscited by 28
  31. 2023DELPHI: Data for Evaluating LLMs' Performance in Handling Controversial Issuescited by 11

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 3.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025Improving LLM Safety Alignment with Dual-Objective Optimization
  2. 2024JailPO: A Novel Black-box Jailbreak Framework via Preference Optimization against Aligned LLMs
  3. 2026Expected Harm: Rethinking Safety Evaluation of (Mis)Aligned LLMs
  4. 2024LIAR: Leveraging Inference Time Alignment (Best-of-N) to Jailbreak LLMs in Seconds
  5. 2026Few-Shot Truly Benign DPO Attack for Jailbreaking LLMs
  6. 2026Pruning Unsafe Tickets: A Resource-Efficient Framework for Safer and More Robust LLMs
  7. 2026How Jailbreak Attacks Inform Safety Alignment: A Defender-Centric, Shapley-Based Evaluation of Jailbreak Contributions
  8. 2025You Can't Eat Your Cake and Have It Too: The Performance Degradation of LLMs with Jailbreak Defense