mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Retention Score: Quantifying Jailbreak Risks for Vision Language Models

arXiv 2412.17544 ↗First posted 23 Dec 2024cs.AIcited by 2

On the map: Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models → MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness

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Abstract (arXiv)

The emergence of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) is a significant advancement in integrating computer vision with Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance multi-modal machine learning capabilities. However, this progress has also made VLMs vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks, raising concerns about their reliability. The objective of this paper is to assess the resilience of VLMs against jailbreak attacks that can compromise model safety compliance and result in harmful outputs. To evaluate a VLM's ability to maintain its robustness against adversarial input perturbations, we propose a novel metric called the Retention Score. Retention Score is a multi-modal evaluation metric that includes Retention-I and Retention-T scores for quantifying jailbreak risks in visual and textual components of VLMs. Our process involves generating synthetic image-text pairs using a conditional diffusion model. These pairs are then predicted for toxicity score by a VLM alongside a toxicity judgment classifier. By calculating the margin in toxicity scores, we can quantify the robustness of the VLM in an attack-agnostic manner. Our work has four main contributions. First, we prove that Retention Score can serve as a certified robustness metric. Second, we demonstrate that most VLMs with visual components are less robust against jailbreak attacks than the corresponding plain VLMs. Additionally, we evaluate black-box VLM APIs and find that the security settings in Google Gemini significantly affect the score and robustness. Moreover, the robustness of GPT4V is similar to the medium settings of Gemini. Finally, our approach offers a time-efficient alternative to existing adversarial attack methods and provides consistent model robustness rankings when evaluated on VLMs including MiniGPT-4, InstructBLIP, and LLaVA.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models. Builds on 15 of its 44 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Dec 2024.

Builds on

15 of 44 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2023Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Aligned Large Language Models22 Jun

Other references · 14

  1. 2020Language Models are Few-Shot Learnerscited by 32,419
  2. 2021High-Resolution Image Synthesis with Latent Diffusion Modelscited by 18,863
  3. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
  4. 2022BLIP: Bootstrapping Language-Image Pre-training for Unified Vision-Language Understanding and Generationcited by 4,322
  5. 2021Finetuned Language Models Are Zero-Shot Learnerscited by 3,780
  6. 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,720
  7. 2023InstructBLIP: Towards General-purpose Vision-Language Models with Instruction Tuningcited by 2,876
  8. 2020RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating Neural Toxic Degeneration in Language Modelscited by 1,255
  9. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!cited by 1,154
  10. 2023EVA-CLIP: Improved Training Techniques for CLIP at Scalecited by 798
  11. 2022EVA: Exploring the Limits of Masked Visual Representation Learning at Scalecited by 691
  12. 2019On Evaluating Adversarial Robustnesscited by 447
2 more
  1. 2023Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned?cited by 315
  2. 2018Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks: An Extreme Value Theory Approachcited by 182

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 1.

2 papers.

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  1. 2025CeTAD: Towards Certified Toxicity-Aware Distance in Vision Language Models
  2. 2025JaiLIP: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Loss Guided Image Perturbation
  3. 2024ImgTrojan: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models with ONE Image
  4. 2025Safeguarding Vision-Language Models: Mitigating Vulnerabilities to Gaussian Noise in Perturbation-based Attacks
  5. 2025A Framework for Evaluating Vision-Language Model Safety: Building Trust in AI for Public Sector Applications
  6. 2024Learning To See But Forgetting To Follow: Visual Instruction Tuning Makes LLMs More Prone To Jailbreak Attacks
  7. 2025HiddenDetect: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks against Large Vision-Language Models via Monitoring Hidden States
  8. 2025HoliSafe: Holistic Safety Benchmarking and Modeling for Vision-Language Model