What AI evaluations for preventing catastrophic risks can and cannot do
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Abstract (arXiv)
AI evaluations are an important component of the AI governance toolkit, underlying current approaches to safety cases for preventing catastrophic risks. Our paper examines what these evaluations can and cannot tell us. Evaluations can establish lower bounds on AI capabilities and assess certain misuse risks given sufficient effort from evaluators. Unfortunately, evaluations face fundamental limitations that cannot be overcome within the current paradigm. These include an inability to establish upper bounds on capabilities, reliably forecast future model capabilities, or robustly assess risks from autonomous AI systems. This means that while evaluations are valuable tools, we should not rely on them as our main way of ensuring AI systems are safe. We conclude with recommendations for incremental improvements to frontier AI safety, while acknowledging these fundamental limitations remain unsolved.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 14 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Nov 2024.
Builds on
14 of 24 references.
References · 14
- 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,193
- 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 131
- 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilitiescited by 125
- 2024Black-Box Access is Insufficient for Rigorous AI Auditscited by 123
- 2024Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilitiescited by 121
- 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websitescited by 108
- 2024Teams of LLM Agents can Exploit Zero-Day Vulnerabilitiescited by 93
- 2024CyberSecEval 2: A Wide-Ranging Cybersecurity Evaluation Suite for Large Language Modelscited by 84
- 2024Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systemscited by 48
- 2024Stress-Testing Capability Elicitation With Password-Locked Modelscited by 42
- 2023AI capabilities can be significantly improved without expensive retrainingcited by 28
- 2024Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argumentcited by 19
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 3.
4 papers.
- 2025AI Companies Should Report Pre- and Post-Mitigation Safety Evaluationscited by 3
- 2026Scaffold Effects on GAIA: A Controlled Comparisoncited by 3
- 2026Questionnaire Responses Do not Capture the Safety of AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026One Perturbation Is Not Enough: Identifiability and Blind Baselines for Behavioral AI Evaluationcited by 0
- 2026One Perturbation Is Not Enough: Identifiability and Blind Baselines for Behavioral AI Evaluation5 Sep 2026
- 2026Scaffold Effects on GAIA: A Controlled Comparison7 Jun 2026
- 2026Questionnaire Responses Do not Capture the Safety of AI Agents15 Mar 2026
- 2025AI Companies Should Report Pre- and Post-Mitigation Safety Evaluations17 Mar 2025