mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

What AI evaluations for preventing catastrophic risks can and cannot do

arXiv 2412.08653 ↗First posted 26 Nov 2024cs.CY cs.AIcited by 4

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Abstract (arXiv)

AI evaluations are an important component of the AI governance toolkit, underlying current approaches to safety cases for preventing catastrophic risks. Our paper examines what these evaluations can and cannot tell us. Evaluations can establish lower bounds on AI capabilities and assess certain misuse risks given sufficient effort from evaluators. Unfortunately, evaluations face fundamental limitations that cannot be overcome within the current paradigm. These include an inability to establish upper bounds on capabilities, reliably forecast future model capabilities, or robustly assess risks from autonomous AI systems. This means that while evaluations are valuable tools, we should not rely on them as our main way of ensuring AI systems are safe. We conclude with recommendations for incremental improvements to frontier AI safety, while acknowledging these fundamental limitations remain unsolved.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 14 of its 24 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Nov 2024.

Builds on

14 of 24 references.

References · 14

  1. 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,193
  2. 2024AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluationscited by 131
  3. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilitiescited by 125
  4. 2024Black-Box Access is Insufficient for Rigorous AI Auditscited by 123
  5. 2024Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilitiescited by 121
  6. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websitescited by 108
  7. 2024Teams of LLM Agents can Exploit Zero-Day Vulnerabilitiescited by 93
  8. 2024CyberSecEval 2: A Wide-Ranging Cybersecurity Evaluation Suite for Large Language Modelscited by 84
  9. 2024Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systemscited by 48
  10. 2024Stress-Testing Capability Elicitation With Password-Locked Modelscited by 42
  11. 2023AI capabilities can be significantly improved without expensive retrainingcited by 28
  12. 2024Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argumentcited by 19
2 more
  1. 2023Coordinated pausing: An evaluation-based coordination scheme for frontier AI developerscited by 13
  2. 2024Declare and Justify: Explicit assumptions in AI evaluations are necessary for effective regulationcited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 3.

4 papers.