The Reality of AI and Biorisk
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
To accurately and confidently answer the question 'could an AI model or system increase biorisk', it is necessary to have both a sound theoretical threat model for how AI models or systems could increase biorisk and a robust method for testing that threat model. This paper provides an analysis of existing available research surrounding two AI and biorisk threat models: 1) access to information and planning via large language models (LLMs), and 2) the use of AI-enabled biological tools (BTs) in synthesizing novel biological artifacts. We find that existing studies around AI-related biorisk are nascent, often speculative in nature, or limited in terms of their methodological maturity and transparency. The available literature suggests that current LLMs and BTs do not pose an immediate risk, and more work is needed to develop rigorous approaches to understanding how future models could increase biorisks. We end with recommendations about how empirical work can be expanded to more precisely target biorisk and ensure rigor and validity of findings.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 76 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Dec 2024.
Builds on
7 of 76 references.
References · 7
- 2024Aya Dataset: An Open-Access Collection for Multilingual Instruction Tuningcited by 174
- 2024On the Societal Impact of Open Foundation Modelscited by 64
- 2024Open Problems in Technical AI Governancecited by 45
- 2024Medical Adaptation of Large Language and Vision-Language Models: Are We Making Progress?cited by 28
- 2024Specialized Foundation Models Struggle to Beat Supervised Baselinescited by 23
- 2024On the Limitations of Compute Thresholds as a Governance Strategycited by 17
- 2023Towards Responsible Governance of Biological Design Toolscited by 5
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 4; 2026: 4.
8 papers.
- 2025AI Safety Should Prioritize the Future of Workcited by 11
- 2025Distinguishing Task-Specific and General-Purpose AI in Regulationcited by 3
- 2025GenoArmory: A Unified Evaluation Framework for Adversarial Attacks on Genomic Foundation Modelscited by 2
- 2026Measuring Biological Capabilities and Risks of AI Agentscited by 1
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Riskscited by 0
- 2026The Case for ESM3 as a General-Purpose AI Model with Systemic Risk Under the EU AI Actcited by 0
- 2026Position: Preventing AI-Generated CSAM Necessitates New Approaches to AI Safetycited by 0
- 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?cited by 0
- 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?1 Sep 2026
- 2026Measuring Biological Capabilities and Risks of AI Agents18 Jun 2026
- 2026Position: Preventing AI-Generated CSAM Necessitates New Approaches to AI Safety9 Jun 2026
- 2026The Case for ESM3 as a General-Purpose AI Model with Systemic Risk Under the EU AI Act2 May 2026
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Risks8 Aug 2025
- 2025Distinguishing Task-Specific and General-Purpose AI in Regulation19 Jun 2025
- 2025GenoArmory: A Unified Evaluation Framework for Adversarial Attacks on Genomic Foundation Models16 May 2025
- 2025AI Safety Should Prioritize the Future of Work16 Apr 2025