Safe + Safe = Unsafe? Exploring How Safe Images Can Be Exploited to Jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models
On the map: LLM reasoning → Reasoning for agents, planning and code
also in 2 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Recent advances in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have showcased strong reasoning abilities across multiple modalities, achieving significant breakthroughs in various real-world applications. Despite this great success, the safety guardrail of LVLMs may not cover the unforeseen domains introduced by the visual modality. Existing studies primarily focus on eliciting LVLMs to generate harmful responses via carefully crafted image-based jailbreaks designed to bypass alignment defenses. In this study, we reveal that a safe image can be exploited to achieve the same jailbreak consequence when combined with additional safe images and prompts. This stems from two fundamental properties of LVLMs: universal reasoning capabilities and safety snowball effect. Building on these insights, we propose Safety Snowball Agent (SSA), a novel agent-based framework leveraging agents' autonomous and tool-using abilities to jailbreak LVLMs. SSA operates through two principal stages: (1) initial response generation, where tools generate or retrieve jailbreak images based on potential harmful intents, and (2) harmful snowballing, where refined subsequent prompts induce progressively harmful outputs. Our experiments demonstrate that ours can use nearly any image to induce LVLMs to produce unsafe content, achieving high success jailbreaking rates against the latest LVLMs. Unlike prior works that exploit alignment flaws, ours leverages the inherent properties of LVLMs, presenting a profound challenge for enforcing safety in generative multimodal systems. Our code is avaliable at urlhttps://github.com/gzcch/SafetySnowballAgent.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Reasoning for agents, planning and code, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning. Builds on 48 of its 72 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Nov 2024.
Builds on
48 of 72 references.
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36 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 7.
10 papers.
- 2025AlphaAlign: Incentivizing Safety Alignment with Extremely Simplified Reinforcement Learningcited by 15
- 2025Attention! Your Vision Language Model Could Be Maliciously Manipulatedcited by 12
- 2026Risky-Bench: Probing Agentic Safety Risks under Real-World Deploymentcited by 8
- 2026Narrow Fine-Tuning Erodes Safety Alignment in Vision-Language Agentscited by 6
- 2026Towards Policy-Adaptive Image Guardrail: Benchmark and Methodcited by 6
- 2025ARMs: Adaptive Red-Teaming Agent against Multimodal Models with Plug-and-Play Attackscited by 5
- 2026Visual Exclusivity Attacks: Automatic Multimodal Red Teaming via Agentic Planningcited by 4
- 2026Robustness of Vision Language Models Against Split-Image Harmful Input Attackscited by 1
- 2026The Salami Slicing Threat: Exploiting Cumulative Risks in LLM Systemscited by 1
- 2026STARE: Step-wise Temporal Alignment and Red-teaming Engine for Multi-modal Toxicity Attackcited by 0
- 2026STARE: Step-wise Temporal Alignment and Red-teaming Engine for Multi-modal Toxicity Attack1 May 2026
- 2026The Salami Slicing Threat: Exploiting Cumulative Risks in LLM Systems13 Apr 2026
- 2026Towards Policy-Adaptive Image Guardrail: Benchmark and Method1 Mar 2026
- 2026Narrow Fine-Tuning Erodes Safety Alignment in Vision-Language Agents18 Feb 2026
- 2026Robustness of Vision Language Models Against Split-Image Harmful Input Attacks8 Feb 2026
- 2026Visual Exclusivity Attacks: Automatic Multimodal Red Teaming via Agentic Planning5 Feb 2026
- 2026Risky-Bench: Probing Agentic Safety Risks under Real-World Deployment3 Feb 2026
- 2025ARMs: Adaptive Red-Teaming Agent against Multimodal Models with Plug-and-Play Attacks3 Oct 2025
- 2025AlphaAlign: Incentivizing Safety Alignment with Extremely Simplified Reinforcement Learning20 Jul 2025
- 2025Attention! Your Vision Language Model Could Be Maliciously Manipulated26 May 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025PRISM: Programmatic Reasoning with Image Sequence Manipulation for LVLM Jailbreaking
- 2026When Think-with-Image Meets Safety: What Determines Multimodal Jailbreak Robustness?
- 2026Jailbreaks on Vision Language Model via Multimodal Reasoning
- 2026Beyond Visual Safety: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models for Harmful Image Generation via Semantic-Agnostic Inputs
- 2025Agentic Moderation: Multi-Agent Design for Safer Vision-Language Models
- 2025HiddenDetect: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks against Large Vision-Language Models via Monitoring Hidden States
- 2025JailBound: Jailbreaking Internal Safety Boundaries of Vision-Language Models
- 2026Safety-Potential Pruning for Enhancing Safety Prompts Against VLM Jailbreaking Without Retraining