mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Regularized Robustly Reliable Learners and Instance Targeted Attacks

arXiv 2410.10572 ↗First posted 14 Oct 2024cs.LG cs.CR cs.DScited by 5

On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks

Abstract (arXiv)

Instance-targeted data poisoning attacks, where an adversary corrupts a training set to induce errors on specific test points, have raised significant concerns. Balcan et al (2022) proposed an approach to addressing this challenge by defining a notion of robustly-reliable learners that provide per-instance guarantees of correctness under well-defined assumptions, even in the presence of data poisoning attacks. They then give a generic optimal (but computationally inefficient) robustly reliable learner as well as a computationally efficient algorithm for the case of linear separators over log-concave distributions. In this work, we address two challenges left open by Balcan et al (2022). The first is that the definition of robustly-reliable learners in Balcan et al (2022) becomes vacuous for highly-flexible hypothesis classes: if there are two classifiers h0, h1 ∈ H both with zero error on the training set such that h0(x) neq h1(x), then a robustly-reliable learner must abstain on x. We address this problem by defining a modified notion of regularized robustly-reliable learners that allows for nontrivial statements in this case. The second is that the generic algorithm of Balcan et al (2022) requires re-running an ERM oracle (essentially, retraining the classifier) on each test point x, which is generally impractical even if ERM can be implemented efficiently. To tackle this problem, we show that at least in certain interesting cases we can design algorithms that can produce their outputs in time sublinear in training time, by using techniques from dynamic algorithm design.

Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 11 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Oct 2024.

Builds on

11 of 31 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2022Robustly-reliable learners under poisoning attacks8 Mar

Other references · 10

  1. 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,055
  2. 2018Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networkscited by 519
  3. 2020Witches' Brew: Industrial Scale Data Poisoning via Gradient Matchingcited by 163
  4. 2020Deep Partition Aggregation: Provable Defense against General Poisoning Attackscited by 115
  5. 2018Technical Report: When Does Machine Learning FAIL? Generalized Transferability for Evasion and Poisoning Attackscited by 81
  6. 2022Maximum Flow and Minimum-Cost Flow in Almost-Linear Timecited by 28
  7. 2021Learning and Certification under Instance-targeted Poisoningcited by 13
  8. 2020Noise in Classificationcited by 11
  9. 2023Reliable learning in challenging environmentscited by 10
  10. 2022Faster Min-Plus Product for Monotone Instancescited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 2.

5 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2023What Distributions are Robust to Indiscriminate Poisoning Attacks for Linear Learners?
  2. 2025On Robustness of Linear Classifiers to Targeted Data Poisoning
  3. 2022On Optimal Learning Under Targeted Data Poisoning
  4. 2022Not All Poisons are Created Equal: Robust Training against Data Poisoning
  5. 2024Certified Robustness to Data Poisoning in Gradient-Based Training
  6. 2025Keeping up with dynamic attackers: Certifying robustness to adaptive online data poisoning
  7. 2026Theory of Continual Learning Against Data Poisoning Attacks
  8. 2023Pick your Poison: Undetectability versus Robustness in Data Poisoning Attacks