mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Overriding Safety protections of Open-source Models

arXiv 2409.19476 ↗First posted 28 Sep 2024cs.CL cs.CRcited by 3

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails

Abstract (arXiv)

LLMs(Large Language Models) nowadays have widespread adoption as a tool for solving issues across various domain/tasks. These models since are susceptible to produce harmful or toxic results, inference-time adversarial attacks, therefore they do undergo safety alignment training and Red teaming for putting in safety guardrails. For using these models, usually fine-tuning is done for model alignment on the desired tasks, which can make model more aligned but also make it more susceptible to produce unsafe responses, if fine-tuned with harmful data.In this paper, we study how much of impact introduction of harmful data in fine-tuning can make, and if it can override the safety protection of those models. Conversely,it was also explored that if model is fine-tuned on safety data can make the model produce more safer responses. Further we explore if fine-tuning the model on harmful data makes it less helpful or less trustworthy because of increase in model uncertainty leading to knowledge drift. Our extensive experimental results shown that Safety protection in an open-source can be overridden, when fine-tuned with harmful data as observed by ASR increasing by 35% when compared to basemodel's ASR. Also, as observed, fine-tuning a model with harmful data made the harmful fine-tuned model highly uncertain with huge knowledge drift and less truthfulness in its responses. Furthermore, for the safe fine-tuned model, ASR decreases by 51.68% as compared to the basemodel, and Safe model also shown in minor drop in uncertainty and truthfulness as compared to basemodel. This paper's code is available at: https://github.com/techsachinkr/Overriding_Model_Safety_Protections

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 8 of its 12 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Sep 2024.

Builds on

8 of 12 references.

References · 8

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,192
  2. 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 9,743
  3. 2021Measuring Mathematical Problem Solving With the MATH Datasetcited by 5,203
  4. 2017TriviaQA: A Large Scale Distantly Supervised Challenge Dataset for Reading Comprehensioncited by 2,895
  5. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  6. 2021Are NLP Models really able to Solve Simple Math Word Problems?cited by 861
  7. 2021Did Aristotle Use a Laptop? A Question Answering Benchmark with Implicit Reasoning Strategiescited by 736
  8. 2024Understanding Knowledge Drift in LLMs through Misinformationcited by 9

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Cited by year

Citing papers per year: 2025: 3.

3 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!
  2. 2025Fine-Tuning Lowers Safety and Disrupts Evaluation Consistency
  3. 2025Secure LLM Fine-Tuning via Safety-Aware Probing
  4. 2026Few Tokens, Big Leverage: Preserving Safety Alignment by Constraining Safety Tokens during Fine-tuning
  5. 2024What Makes and Breaks Safety Fine-tuning? A Mechanistic Study
  6. 2024Locking Down the Finetuned LLMs Safety
  7. 2026The Art of (Mis)alignment: How Fine-Tuning Methods Effectively Misalign and Realign LLMs in Post-Training
  8. 2025Rethinking Safety in LLM Fine-tuning: An Optimization Perspective