SENTAUR: Security EnhaNced Trojan Assessment Using LLMs Against Undesirable Revisions
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Abstract (arXiv)
A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce stealthy HT behavior, prevent an IC work as intended, or leak sensitive data via side channels. To counter HTs, rapidly examining HT scenarios is a key requirement. While Trust-Hub benchmarks are a good starting point to assess defenses, they encompass a small subset of manually created HTs within the expanse of HT designs. Further, the HTs may disappear during synthesis. We propose a large language model (LLM) framework SENTAUR to generate a suite of legitimate HTs for a Register Transfer Level (RTL) design by learning its specifications, descriptions, and natural language descriptions of HT effects. Existing tools and benchmarks are limited; they need a learning period to construct an ML model to mimic the threat model and are difficult to reproduce. SENTAUR can swiftly produce HT instances by leveraging LLMs without any learning period and sanitizing the HTs facilitating their rapid assessment. Evaluation of SENTAUR involved generating effective, synthesizable, and practical HTs from TrustHub and elsewhere, investigating impacts of payloads/triggers at the RTL. While our evaluation focused on HT insertion, SENTAUR can generalize to automatically transform an RTL code to have defined functional modifications.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 2 of its 15 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Jul 2024.
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2 of 15 references.
References · 2
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 0; 2026: 2.
3 papers.
- 2024SPICED: Syntactical Bug and Trojan Pattern Identification in A/MS Circuits using LLM-Enhanced Detectioncited by 7
- 2026Can Agents Secure Hardware? Evaluating Agentic LLM-Driven Obfuscation for IP Protectioncited by 3
- 2026TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertioncited by 2
- 2026Can Agents Secure Hardware? Evaluating Agentic LLM-Driven Obfuscation for IP Protection14 Apr 2026
- 2026TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertion23 Jan 2026
- 2024SPICED: Syntactical Bug and Trojan Pattern Identification in A/MS Circuits using LLM-Enhanced Detection25 Aug 2024