mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Automated Progressive Red Teaming

arXiv 2407.03876 ↗First posted 4 Jul 2024cs.CR cs.CLcited by 12

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is paramount, yet identifying potential vulnerabilities is challenging. While manual red teaming is effective, it is time-consuming, costly and lacks scalability. Automated red teaming (ART) offers a more cost-effective alternative, automatically generating adversarial prompts to expose LLM vulnerabilities. However, in current ART efforts, a robust framework is absent, which explicitly frames red teaming as an effectively learnable task. To address this gap, we propose Automated Progressive Red Teaming (APRT) as an effectively learnable framework. APRT leverages three core modules: an Intention Expanding LLM that generates diverse initial attack samples, an Intention Hiding LLM that crafts deceptive prompts, and an Evil Maker to manage prompt diversity and filter ineffective samples. The three modules collectively and progressively explore and exploit LLM vulnerabilities through multi-round interactions. In addition to the framework, we further propose a novel indicator, Attack Effectiveness Rate (AER) to mitigate the limitations of existing evaluation metrics. By measuring the likelihood of eliciting unsafe but seemingly helpful responses, AER aligns closely with human evaluations. Extensive experiments with both automatic and human evaluations, demonstrate the effectiveness of ARPT across both open- and closed-source LLMs. Specifically, APRT effectively elicits 54% unsafe yet useful responses from Meta's Llama-3-8B-Instruct, 50% from GPT-4o (API access), and 39% from Claude-3.5 (API access), showcasing its robust attack capability and transferability across LLMs (especially from open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs).

Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 20 of its 42 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Jul 2024.

Builds on

20 of 42 references.

Closest ancestors · 5

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal6 Feb
  2. 2023AART: AI-Assisted Red-Teaming with Diverse Data Generation for New LLM-powered Applications14 Nov
  3. 2023MART: Improving LLM Safety with Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming13 Nov
  4. 2023Red-Teaming Large Language Models using Chain of Utterances for Safety-Alignment18 Aug
  5. 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models7 Feb

Other references · 15

  1. 2023Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Modelscited by 12,865
  2. 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,634
  3. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  4. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
  5. 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
  6. 2023BeaverTails: Towards Improved Safety Alignment of LLM via a Human-Preference Datasetcited by 828
  7. 2019Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLPcited by 709
  8. 2024How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMscited by 533
  9. 2023Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexitycited by 411
  10. 2023GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Ciphercited by 401
  11. 2023Exploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attackscited by 268
  12. 2023A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easilycited by 242
3 more
  1. 2023Automatically Auditing Large Language Models via Discrete Optimizationcited by 187
  2. 2023FLIRT: Feedback Loop In-context Red Teamingcited by 81
  3. 2023DeceptPrompt: Exploiting LLM-driven Code Generation via Adversarial Natural Language Instructionscited by 31

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 7; 2026: 3.

12 papers.