Automated Progressive Red Teaming
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is paramount, yet identifying potential vulnerabilities is challenging. While manual red teaming is effective, it is time-consuming, costly and lacks scalability. Automated red teaming (ART) offers a more cost-effective alternative, automatically generating adversarial prompts to expose LLM vulnerabilities. However, in current ART efforts, a robust framework is absent, which explicitly frames red teaming as an effectively learnable task. To address this gap, we propose Automated Progressive Red Teaming (APRT) as an effectively learnable framework. APRT leverages three core modules: an Intention Expanding LLM that generates diverse initial attack samples, an Intention Hiding LLM that crafts deceptive prompts, and an Evil Maker to manage prompt diversity and filter ineffective samples. The three modules collectively and progressively explore and exploit LLM vulnerabilities through multi-round interactions. In addition to the framework, we further propose a novel indicator, Attack Effectiveness Rate (AER) to mitigate the limitations of existing evaluation metrics. By measuring the likelihood of eliciting unsafe but seemingly helpful responses, AER aligns closely with human evaluations. Extensive experiments with both automatic and human evaluations, demonstrate the effectiveness of ARPT across both open- and closed-source LLMs. Specifically, APRT effectively elicits 54% unsafe yet useful responses from Meta's Llama-3-8B-Instruct, 50% from GPT-4o (API access), and 39% from Claude-3.5 (API access), showcasing its robust attack capability and transferability across LLMs (especially from open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs).
Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 20 of its 42 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Jul 2024.
Builds on
20 of 42 references.
Closest ancestors · 5
Same direction, newest first
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal6 Feb
- 2023AART: AI-Assisted Red-Teaming with Diverse Data Generation for New LLM-powered Applications14 Nov
- 2023MART: Improving LLM Safety with Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming13 Nov
- 2023Red-Teaming Large Language Models using Chain of Utterances for Safety-Alignment18 Aug
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models7 Feb
Other references · 15
- 2023Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Modelscited by 12,865
- 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,634
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
- 2023BeaverTails: Towards Improved Safety Alignment of LLM via a Human-Preference Datasetcited by 828
- 2019Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLPcited by 709
- 2024How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMscited by 533
- 2023Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexitycited by 411
- 2023GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Ciphercited by 401
- 2023Exploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attackscited by 268
- 2023A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easilycited by 242
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 7; 2026: 3.
12 papers.
- 2025Foot-In-The-Door: A Multi-turn Jailbreak for LLMscited by 50
- 2024Operationalizing a Threat Model for Red-Teaming Large Language Models (LLMs)cited by 44
- 2025Automated Capability Discovery via Foundation Model Self-Explorationcited by 8
- 2024Alignment with Preference Optimization Is All You Need for LLM Safetycited by 5
- 2025CoBia: Constructed Conversations Can Trigger Otherwise Concealed Societal Biases in LLMscited by 5
- 2025SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defensescited by 4
- 2026APT-Agent: Automated Penetration Testing using Large Language Modelscited by 2
- 2025Forewarned is Forearmed: Pre-Synthesizing Jailbreak-like Instructions to Enhance LLM Safety Guardrail to Potential Attackscited by 1
- 2025A Real-Time, Self-Tuning Moderator Framework for Adversarial Prompt Detectioncited by 0
- 2025ForgeDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Modelscited by 0
- 2026NodeSynth: Socially Aligned Synthetic Data for AI Evaluationcited by 0
- 2026A Red Teaming Framework for Large Language Models: A Case Study on Faithfulness Evaluationcited by 0
- 2026A Red Teaming Framework for Large Language Models: A Case Study on Faithfulness Evaluation24 Jun 2026
- 2026APT-Agent: Automated Penetration Testing using Large Language Models24 May 2026
- 2026NodeSynth: Socially Aligned Synthetic Data for AI Evaluation14 May 2026
- 2025ForgeDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models17 Nov 2025
- 2025SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses17 Oct 2025
- 2025CoBia: Constructed Conversations Can Trigger Otherwise Concealed Societal Biases in LLMs10 Oct 2025
- 2025Forewarned is Forearmed: Pre-Synthesizing Jailbreak-like Instructions to Enhance LLM Safety Guardrail to Potential Attacks27 Aug 2025
- 2025A Real-Time, Self-Tuning Moderator Framework for Adversarial Prompt Detection10 Aug 2025
- 2025Foot-In-The-Door: A Multi-turn Jailbreak for LLMs27 Feb 2025
- 2025Automated Capability Discovery via Foundation Model Self-Exploration11 Feb 2025
- 2024Alignment with Preference Optimization Is All You Need for LLM Safety12 Sep 2024
- 2024Operationalizing a Threat Model for Red-Teaming Large Language Models (LLMs)20 Jul 2024