Laminator: Verifiable ML Property Cards using Hardware-assisted Attestations
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Abstract (arXiv)
Regulations increasingly call for various assurances from machine learning (ML) model providers about their training data, training process, and model behavior. For better transparency, industry (e.g., Huggingface and Google) has adopted model cards and datasheets to describe various properties of training datasets and models. In the same vein, we introduce the notion of inference cards to describe the properties of a given inference (e.g., binding of the output to the model and its corresponding input). We coin the term ML property cards to collectively refer to these various types of cards. To prevent a malicious model provider from including false information in ML property cards, they need to be verifiable. We show how to construct verifiable ML property cards using property attestation, technical mechanisms by which a prover (e.g., a model provider) can attest to various ML properties to a verifier (e.g., an auditor). Since prior attestation mechanisms based purely on cryptography are often narrowly focused (lacking versatility) and inefficient, we need an efficient mechanism to attest different types of properties across the entire ML model pipeline. Emerging widespread support for confidential computing has made it possible to run and even train models inside hardware-assisted trusted execution environments (TEEs), which provide highly efficient attestation mechanisms. We propose Laminator, which uses TEEs to provide the first framework for verifiable ML property cards via hardware-assisted ML property attestations. Laminator is efficient in terms of overhead, scalable to large numbers of verifiers, and versatile with respect to the properties it can prove during training or inference.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 25 Jun 2024.
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 2; 2026: 6.
9 papers.
- 2025Atlas: A Framework for ML Lifecycle Provenance & Transparencycited by 8
- 2026AIBoMGen: Generating an AI Bill of Materials for Secure, Transparent, and Compliant Model Trainingcited by 6
- 2026Proof-of-Guardrail in AI Agents and What (Not) to Trust from Itcited by 4
- 2024Combining Machine Learning Defenses without Conflictscited by 2
- 2025Verifiable Fine-Tuning for LLMs: Zero-Knowledge Training Proofs Bound to Data Provenance and Policycited by 2
- 2026Verifiable Manifest Signing and Transparency Enforcement for Secure MCP-Based LLM Pipelinescited by 2
- 2026OVIG: Optimistic Verification of AI Training Integrity via Gradient Signalscited by 0
- 2026A Large-Scale Measurement of AI Bill of Materials Completeness in Hugging Face Modelscited by 0
- 2026ServeGuard: Verifiable, Bounded-Residual Confinement of Operator-Invisible Channels Without Revealing the Certified Read Factorcited by 0
- 2026ServeGuard: Verifiable, Bounded-Residual Confinement of Operator-Invisible Channels Without Revealing the Certified Read Factor18 Sep 2026
- 2026A Large-Scale Measurement of AI Bill of Materials Completeness in Hugging Face Models19 Jul 2026
- 2026OVIG: Optimistic Verification of AI Training Integrity via Gradient Signals19 Jun 2026
- 2026Proof-of-Guardrail in AI Agents and What (Not) to Trust from It6 Mar 2026
- 2026Verifiable Manifest Signing and Transparency Enforcement for Secure MCP-Based LLM Pipelines30 Jan 2026
- 2026AIBoMGen: Generating an AI Bill of Materials for Secure, Transparent, and Compliant Model Training9 Jan 2026
- 2025Verifiable Fine-Tuning for LLMs: Zero-Knowledge Training Proofs Bound to Data Provenance and Policy19 Oct 2025
- 2025Atlas: A Framework for ML Lifecycle Provenance & Transparency26 Feb 2025
- 2024Combining Machine Learning Defenses without Conflicts14 Nov 2024