Jailbreaking Large Language Models Through Alignment Vulnerabilities in Out-of-Distribution Settings
On the map: LLM safety and security → Jailbreaking
Abstract (arXiv)
Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered significant attention for their exceptional natural language processing capabilities. However, concerns about their trustworthiness remain unresolved, particularly in addressing ``jailbreaking'' attacks on aligned LLMs. Previous research predominantly relies on scenarios involving white-box LLMs or specific, fixed prompt templates, which are often impractical and lack broad applicability. In this paper, we introduce a straightforward and novel method called ObscurePrompt for jailbreaking LLMs, inspired by the observed fragile alignments in Out-of-Distribution (OOD) data. Specifically, we first formulate the decision boundary in the jailbreaking process and then explore how obscure text affects LLM's ethical decision boundary. ObscurePrompt starts with constructing a base prompt that integrates well-known jailbreaking techniques. Powerful LLMs are then utilized to obscure the original prompt through iterative transformations, aiming to bolster the attack's robustness. Comprehensive experiments show that our approach substantially improves upon previous methods in terms of attack effectiveness, maintaining efficacy against two prevalent defense mechanisms.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. First posted on arXiv 19 Jun 2024.
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 5; 2025: 3.
8 papers.
- 2024Justice or Prejudice? Quantifying Biases in LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 354
- 2025Building a Foundational Guardrail for General Agentic Systems via Synthetic Datacited by 26
- 2024Recent advancements in LLM Red-Teaming: Techniques, Defenses, and Ethical Considerationscited by 8
- 2025AntiDote: Bi-level Adversarial Training for Tamper-Resistant LLMscited by 4
- 2025The Devil in the Details: Emergent Misalignment, Format and Coherence in Open-Weights LLMscited by 4
- 2024Preventing Jailbreak Prompts as Malicious Tools for Cybercriminals: A Cyber Defense Perspectivecited by 3
- 2024Can Large Language Models Automatically Jailbreak GPT-4V?cited by 1
- 2024"Moralized" Multi-Step Jailbreak Prompts: Black-Box Testing of Guardrails in Large Language Models for Verbal Attackscited by 0
- 2025The Devil in the Details: Emergent Misalignment, Format and Coherence in Open-Weights LLMs25 Nov 2025
- 2025Building a Foundational Guardrail for General Agentic Systems via Synthetic Data10 Oct 2025
- 2025AntiDote: Bi-level Adversarial Training for Tamper-Resistant LLMs6 Sep 2025
- 2024Preventing Jailbreak Prompts as Malicious Tools for Cybercriminals: A Cyber Defense Perspective25 Nov 2024
- 2024"Moralized" Multi-Step Jailbreak Prompts: Black-Box Testing of Guardrails in Large Language Models for Verbal Attacks23 Nov 2024
- 2024Recent advancements in LLM Red-Teaming: Techniques, Defenses, and Ethical Considerations9 Oct 2024
- 2024Justice or Prejudice? Quantifying Biases in LLM-as-a-Judge3 Oct 2024
- 2024Can Large Language Models Automatically Jailbreak GPT-4V?23 Jul 2024
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- 2024Mission Impossible: A Statistical Perspective on Jailbreaking LLMs
- 2024Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Survey
- 2024Defending against Jailbreak through Early Exit Generation of Large Language Models
- 2024Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreak Attacks via Layer-specific Editing
- 2025Playing the Fool: Jailbreaking LLMs and Multimodal LLMs with Out-of-Distribution Strategy
- 2026Why Do Aligned LLMs Remain Jailbreakable: Refusal-Escape Directions, Operator-Level Sources, and Safety-Utility Trade-off
- 2025Paper Summary Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs through LLM Safety Papers
- 2025HAMSA: Hijacking Aligned Compact Models via Stealthy Automation