Stealth edits to large language models

We reveal the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models, and present new methods which can do so without requiring retraining. Our theoretical insights show that a single metric (a measure of the intrinsic dimension of the model's features) can be used to assess a model's editability and reveals its previously unrecognised susceptibility to malicious stealth attacks. This metric is fundamental to predicting the success of a variety of editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these as stealth editing methods, because they directly update a model's weights to specify its response to specific known hallucinating prompts without affecting other model behaviour. By carefully applying our theoretical insights, we are able to introduce a new jet-pack network block which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. We also reveal the vulnerability of language models to stealth attacks: a small change to a model's weights which fixes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks are computationally simple, do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, and therefore represent a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support our methods and their theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.