A Study of Backdoors in Instruction Fine-tuned Language Models

Backdoor data poisoning, inserted within instruction examples used to fine-tune a foundation Large Language Model (LLM) for downstream tasks (textite.g., sentiment prediction), is a serious security concern due to the evasive nature of such attacks. The poisoning is usually in the form of a (seemingly innocuous) trigger word or phrase inserted into a very small fraction of the fine-tuning samples from a target class. Such backdoor attacks can: alter response sentiment, violate censorship, over-refuse (invoke censorship for legitimate queries), inject false content, or trigger nonsense responses (hallucinations). In this work we investigate the efficacy of instruction fine-tuning backdoor attacks as attack "hyperparameters" are varied under a variety of scenarios, considering: the trigger location in the poisoned examples; robustness to change in the trigger location, partial triggers, and synonym substitutions at test time; attack transfer from one (fine-tuning) domain to a related test domain; and clean-label vs. dirty-label poisoning. Based on our observations, we propose and evaluate two defenses against these attacks: i) a textitduring-fine-tuning defense based on word-frequency counts that assumes the (possibly poisoned) fine-tuning dataset is available and identifies the backdoor trigger tokens; and ii) a textitpost-fine-tuning defense based on downstream clean fine-tuning of the backdoored LLM with a small defense dataset. Finally, we provide a brief survey of related work on backdoor attacks and defenses.