Governing Through the Cloud: The Intermediary Role of Compute Providers in AI Regulation
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Abstract (arXiv)
As jurisdictions around the world take their first steps toward regulating the most powerful AI systems, such as the EU AI Act and the US Executive Order 14110, there is a growing need for effective enforcement mechanisms that can verify compliance and respond to violations. We argue that compute providers should have legal obligations and ethical responsibilities associated with AI development and deployment, both to provide secure infrastructure and to serve as intermediaries for AI regulation. Compute providers can play an essential role in a regulatory ecosystem via four key capacities: as securers, safeguarding AI systems and critical infrastructure; as record keepers, enhancing visibility for policymakers; as verifiers of customer activities, ensuring oversight; and as enforcers, taking actions against rule violations. We analyze the technical feasibility of performing these functions in a targeted and privacy-conscious manner and present a range of technical instruments. In particular, we describe how non-confidential information, to which compute providers largely already have access, can provide two key governance-relevant properties of a computational workload: its type-e.g., large-scale training or inference-and the amount of compute it has consumed. Using AI Executive Order 14110 as a case study, we outline how the US is beginning to implement record keeping requirements for compute providers. We also explore how verification and enforcement roles could be added to establish a comprehensive AI compute oversight scheme. We argue that internationalization will be key to effective implementation, and highlight the critical challenge of balancing confidentiality and privacy with risk mitigation as the role of compute providers in AI regulation expands.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 13 Mar 2024.
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 3; 2025: 2; 2026: 5.
10 papers.
- 2024On the Limitations of Compute Thresholds as a Governance Strategycited by 18
- 2024Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulationcited by 14
- 2024Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Developmentcited by 10
- 2025International Agreements on AI Safety: Review and Recommendations for a Conditional AI Safety Treatycited by 4
- 2026Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetrycited by 4
- 2025Compute Requirements for Algorithmic Innovation in Frontier AI Modelscited by 2
- 2026Comprehensive AI governance requires addressing non-model gainscited by 1
- 2026Direct Causation in International Humanitarian Law and the Challenge of AI-Mediated Civilian Cyber Operationscited by 0
- 2026The Closing Window: How Governments Could Lose Their Ability to Restrain Advanced AIcited by 0
- 2026Beyond Training: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Inference-Time AI Governancecited by 0
- 2026Beyond Training: A Feasibility Taxonomy for Inference-Time AI Governance9 Sep 2026
- 2026Direct Causation in International Humanitarian Law and the Challenge of AI-Mediated Civilian Cyber Operations28 Jun 2026
- 2026The Closing Window: How Governments Could Lose Their Ability to Restrain Advanced AI26 Jun 2026
- 2026Detecting Hidden ML Training With Zero-Overhead Telemetry17 Jun 2026
- 2026Comprehensive AI governance requires addressing non-model gains1 May 2026
- 2025Compute Requirements for Algorithmic Innovation in Frontier AI Models13 Jul 2025
- 2025International Agreements on AI Safety: Review and Recommendations for a Conditional AI Safety Treaty18 Mar 2025
- 2024On the Limitations of Compute Thresholds as a Governance Strategy8 Jul 2024
- 2024Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulation17 May 2024
- 2024Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development3 Apr 2024