Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes
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Abstract (arXiv)
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of m candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about t < m candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on specific instances of this problem, our paper fully characterizes the set of positional scoring rules that can be computed for any 1 ≤ t < m, which, notably, does not include plurality. We then extend this to show a similar impossibility result for single transferable vote (elimination voting). These negative results are information-theoretic and agnostic to the number of queries. Finally, for scoring rules that are computable with limited-sized queries, we give parameterized upper and lower bounds on the number of such queries a deterministic or randomized algorithm must make to determine the score-maximizing candidate. While there is no gap between our bounds for deterministic algorithms, identifying the exact query complexity for randomized algorithms is a challenging open problem, of which we solve one special case.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 3 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Feb 2024.
Builds on
3 of 27 references.
References · 3
- 2022Representation with Incomplete Votescited by 13
- 2015Sample Complexity for Winner Prediction in Electionscited by 7
- 2019Comparing Election Methods Where Each Voter Ranks Only Few Candidatescited by 4
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 3; 2026: 1.
5 papers.
- 2025Full-Stack Alignment: Co-Aligning AI and Institutions with Thick Models of Valuecited by 6
- 2024DeepVoting: Learning and Fine-Tuning Voting Rules with Canonical Embeddingscited by 2
- 2025Artificial Delegates Resolve Fairness Issues in Perpetual Voting with Partial Turnoutcited by 1
- 2026Linear Social Choice with Few Queries: A Moment-Based Approachcited by 1
- 2025Computing Voting Rules with Improvement Feedbackcited by 0
- 2026Linear Social Choice with Few Queries: A Moment-Based Approach19 Mar 2026
- 2025Full-Stack Alignment: Co-Aligning AI and Institutions with Thick Models of Value3 Dec 2025
- 2025Artificial Delegates Resolve Fairness Issues in Perpetual Voting with Partial Turnout26 Jun 2025
- 2025Computing Voting Rules with Improvement Feedback18 Feb 2025
- 2024DeepVoting: Learning and Fine-Tuning Voting Rules with Canonical Embeddings24 Aug 2024