mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Agents Need Not Know Their Purpose

arXiv 2402.09734 ↗First posted 15 Feb 2024cs.AIcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Ensuring artificial intelligence behaves in such a way that is aligned with human values is commonly referred to as the alignment challenge. Prior work has shown that rational agents, behaving in such a way that maximizes a utility function, will inevitably behave in such a way that is not aligned with human values, especially as their level of intelligence goes up. Prior work has also shown that there is no "one true utility function"; solutions must include a more holistic approach to alignment. This paper describes oblivious agents: agents that are architected in such a way that their effective utility function is an aggregation of a known and hidden sub-functions. The hidden component, to be maximized, is internally implemented as a black box, preventing the agent from examining it. The known component, to be minimized, is knowledge of the hidden sub-function. Architectural constraints further influence how agent actions can evolve its internal environment model. We show that an oblivious agent, behaving rationally, constructs an internal approximation of designers' intentions (i.e., infers alignment), and, as a consequence of its architecture and effective utility function, behaves in such a way that maximizes alignment; i.e., maximizing the approximated intention function. We show that, paradoxically, it does this for whatever utility function is used as the hidden component and, in contrast with extant techniques, chances of alignment actually improve as agent intelligence grows.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 11 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Feb 2024.

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11 of 35 references.

References · 11

  1. 2023ExpeL: LLM Agents Are Experiential Learnerscited by 814
  2. 2017Deep Reinforcement Learning: An Overviewcited by 327
  3. 2023AI Alignment: A Comprehensive Surveycited by 256
  4. 2017Inverse Reward Designcited by 246
  5. 2023Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmarkcited by 174
  6. 2021Goal Misgeneralization in Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 122
  7. 2019Reward Tampering Problems and Solutions in Reinforcement Learning: A Causal Influence Diagram Perspectivecited by 107
  8. 2021Consequences of Misaligned AIcited by 79
  9. 2018Impossibility and Uncertainty Theorems in AI Value Alignment (or why your AGI should not have a utility function)cited by 22
  10. 2020Avoiding Tampering Incentives in Deep RL via Decoupled Approvalcited by 12
  11. 2020AGI Agent Safety by Iteratively Improving the Utility Functioncited by 8

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