mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Universal Backdoor Attacks

arXiv 2312.00157 ↗First posted 30 Nov 2023cs.LG cs.CR cs.CVcited by 7

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Abstract (arXiv)

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 23 of its 38 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Nov 2023.

Builds on

23 of 38 references.

References · 23

  1. 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 51,809
  2. 2021Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervisioncited by 33,456
  3. 2020An Image is Worth 16x16 Words: Transformers for Image Recognition at Scalecited by 29,915
  4. 2014ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challengecited by 8,441
  5. 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,287
  6. 2019Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothingcited by 1,324
  7. 2017BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chaincited by 1,052
  8. 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,012
  9. 2018Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 550
  10. 2018Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networkscited by 500
  11. 2019STRIP: A Defence Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 437
  12. 2020Reflection Backdoor: A Natural Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networkscited by 341
11 more
  1. 2021Neural Attention Distillation: Erasing Backdoor Triggers from Deep Neural Networkscited by 313
  2. 2020Dataset Security for Machine Learning: Data Poisoning, Backdoor Attacks, and Defensescited by 171
  3. 2018Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbationcited by 131
  4. 2018Stronger Data Poisoning Attacks Break Data Sanitization Defensescited by 125
  5. 2021SPECTRE: Defending Against Backdoor Attacks Using Robust Statisticscited by 123
  6. 2022Wild Patterns Reloaded: A Survey of Machine Learning Security against Training Data Poisoningcited by 93
  7. 2021Handcrafted Backdoors in Deep Neural Networkscited by 57
  8. 2023Attacks in Adversarial Machine Learning: A Systematic Survey from the Life-cycle Perspectivecited by 19
  9. 2018Attack Strength vs. Detectability Dilemma in Adversarial Machine Learningcited by 14
  10. 2020Bait and Switch: Online Training Data Poisoning of Autonomous Driving Systemscited by 4
  11. 2019Hardening of Artificial Neural Networks for Use in Safety-Critical Applications -- A Mapping Studycited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 4; 2026: 2.

7 papers.