As Time Goes By: Adding a Temporal Dimension Towards Resolving Delegations in Liquid Democracy
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Abstract (arXiv)
In recent years, the study of various models and questions related to Liquid Democracy has been of growing interest among the community of Computational Social Choice. A concern that has been raised, is that current academic literature focuses solely on static inputs, concealing a key characteristic of Liquid Democracy: the right for a voter to change her mind as time goes by, regarding her options of whether to vote herself or delegate her vote to other participants, till the final voting deadline. In real life, a period of extended deliberation preceding the election-day motivates voters to adapt their behaviour over time, either based on observations of the remaining electorate or on information acquired for the topic at hand. By adding a temporal dimension to Liquid Democracy, such adaptations can increase the number of possible delegation paths and reduce the loss of votes due to delegation cycles or delegating paths towards abstaining agents, ultimately enhancing participation. Our work takes a first step to integrate a time horizon into decision-making problems in Liquid Democracy systems. Our approach, via a computational complexity analysis, exploits concepts and tools from temporal graph theory which turn out to be convenient for our framework.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 10 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Jul 2023.
Builds on
10 of 41 references.
References · 10
- 2015An Introduction to Temporal Graphs: An Algorithmic Perspectivecited by 10
- 2018The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracycited by 10
- 2018Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth-First Delegationcited by 6
- 2018Iterative Delegations in Liquid Democracy with Restricted Preferencescited by 5
- 2021Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegationscited by 5
- 2016Proxy Voting for Better Outcomescited by 3
- 2020On Parameterized Complexity of Liquid Democracycited by 3
- 2021Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegationscited by 3
- 2019Efficient Computation of Optimal Temporal Walks under Waiting-Time Constraintscited by 1
- 2023Measuring a Priori Voting Power -- Taking Delegations Seriouslycited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 1.
1 paper.
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting7 Dec 2023