Boosting Backdoor Attack with A Learnable Poisoning Sample Selection Strategy
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Abstract (arXiv)
Data-poisoning based backdoor attacks aim to insert backdoor into models by manipulating training datasets without controlling the training process of the target model. Existing attack methods mainly focus on designing triggers or fusion strategies between triggers and benign samples. However, they often randomly select samples to be poisoned, disregarding the varying importance of each poisoning sample in terms of backdoor injection. A recent selection strategy filters a fixed-size poisoning sample pool by recording forgetting events, but it fails to consider the remaining samples outside the pool from a global perspective. Moreover, computing forgetting events requires significant additional computing resources. Therefore, how to efficiently and effectively select poisoning samples from the entire dataset is an urgent problem in backdoor attacks.To address it, firstly, we introduce a poisoning mask into the regular backdoor training loss. We suppose that a backdoored model training with hard poisoning samples has a more backdoor effect on easy ones, which can be implemented by hindering the normal training process (ie, maximizing loss wrt mask). To further integrate it with normal training process, we then propose a learnable poisoning sample selection strategy to learn the mask together with the model parameters through a min-max optimization.Specifically, the outer loop aims to achieve the backdoor attack goal by minimizing the loss based on the selected samples, while the inner loop selects hard poisoning samples that impede this goal by maximizing the loss. After several rounds of adversarial training, we finally select effective poisoning samples with high contribution. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach in boosting backdoor attack performance.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 49 of its 66 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Jul 2023.
Builds on
49 of 66 references.
References · 49
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37 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 3.
5 papers.
- 2024Breaking the False Sense of Security in Backdoor Defense through Re-Activation Attackcited by 26
- 2024Mitigating Backdoor Attack by Injecting Proactive Defensive Backdoorcited by 10
- 2025Rethinking Testing for LLM Applications: Characteristics, Challenges, and a Lightweight Interaction Protocolcited by 6
- 2025Class-Conditional Neural Polarizer: A Lightweight and Effective Backdoor Defense by Purifying Poisoned Featurescited by 1
- 2025Poison in the Well: Feature Embedding Disruption in Backdoor Attackscited by 1
- 2025Rethinking Testing for LLM Applications: Characteristics, Challenges, and a Lightweight Interaction Protocol28 Aug 2025
- 2025Poison in the Well: Feature Embedding Disruption in Backdoor Attacks26 May 2025
- 2025Class-Conditional Neural Polarizer: A Lightweight and Effective Backdoor Defense by Purifying Poisoned Features23 Feb 2025
- 2024Breaking the False Sense of Security in Backdoor Defense through Re-Activation Attack25 May 2024
- 2024Mitigating Backdoor Attack by Injecting Proactive Defensive Backdoor25 May 2024