Externalities in Chore Division
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Abstract (arXiv)
The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be concerned with the pieces given to other agents; these externalities naturally appear in fair division situations. We first demonstrate the generalization of the classical concepts of proportionality and envy-freeness while extending the classical model by taking externalities into account.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Mar 2023.
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9 of 41 references.
References · 9
- 2016A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agentscited by 8
- 2019Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chorescited by 4
- 2017The Query Complexity of Cake Cuttingcited by 3
- 2017On the Complexity of Chore Divisioncited by 2
- 2019Fair and Efficient Cake Division with Connected Piecescited by 2
- 2020Dividing Bads is Harder than Dividing Goods: On the Complexity of Fair and Efficient Division of Chorescited by 2
- 2021Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalitiescited by 2
- 2018Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items With Externalitiescited by 1
- 2021Fair Allocation with Special Externalitiescited by 1
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