Differentially Private Optimizers Can Learn Adversarially Robust Models
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Machine learning models have shone in a variety of domains and attracted increasing attention from both the security and the privacy communities. One important yet worrying question is: Will training models under the differential privacy (DP) constraint have an unfavorable impact on their adversarial robustness? While previous works have postulated that privacy comes at the cost of worse robustness, we give the first theoretical analysis to show that DP models can indeed be robust and accurate, even sometimes more robust than their naturally-trained non-private counterparts. We observe three key factors that influence the privacy-robustness-accuracy tradeoff: (1) hyper-parameters for DP optimizers are critical; (2) pre-training on public data significantly mitigates the accuracy and robustness drop; (3) choice of DP optimizers makes a difference. With these factors set properly, we achieve 90% natural accuracy, 72% robust accuracy (+9% than the non-private model) under l2(0.5) attack, and 69% robust accuracy (+16% than the non-private model) with pre-trained SimCLRv2 model under l_∞(4/255) attack on CIFAR10 with ε=2. In fact, we show both theoretically and empirically that DP models are Pareto optimal on the accuracy-robustness tradeoff. Empirically, the robustness of DP models is consistently observed across various datasets and models. We believe our encouraging results are a significant step towards training models that are private as well as robust.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 34 of its 56 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Nov 2022.
Builds on
34 of 56 references.
References · 34
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22 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 2; 2024: 2; 2025: 0; 2026: 2.
6 papers.
- 2024Pre-training Differentially Private Models with Limited Public Datacited by 8
- 2023Augment then Smooth: Reconciling Differential Privacy with Certified Robustnesscited by 6
- 2023SoK: Unintended Interactions among Machine Learning Defenses and Riskscited by 6
- 2024Combining Machine Learning Defenses without Conflictscited by 2
- 2026Differential Privacy in Two-Layer Networks: How DP-SGD Harms Fairness and Robustnesscited by 1
- 2026Reducing information dependency does not cause training data privacy. Adversarially non-robust features docited by 0
- 2026Reducing information dependency does not cause training data privacy. Adversarially non-robust features do14 Jul 2026
- 2026Differential Privacy in Two-Layer Networks: How DP-SGD Harms Fairness and Robustness5 Mar 2026
- 2024Combining Machine Learning Defenses without Conflicts14 Nov 2024
- 2024Pre-training Differentially Private Models with Limited Public Data28 Feb 2024
- 2023SoK: Unintended Interactions among Machine Learning Defenses and Risks7 Dec 2023
- 2023Augment then Smooth: Reconciling Differential Privacy with Certified Robustness14 Jun 2023