Having your Privacy Cake and Eating it Too: Platform-supported Auditing of Social Media Algorithms for Public Interest
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Social media platforms curate access to information and opportunities, and so play a critical role in shaping public discourse today. The opaque nature of the algorithms these platforms use to curate content raises societal questions. Prior studies have used black-box methods to show that these algorithms can lead to biased or discriminatory outcomes. However, existing auditing methods face fundamental limitations because they function independent of the platforms. Concerns of potential harm have prompted proposal of legislation in both the U.S. and the E.U. to mandate a new form of auditing where vetted external researchers get privileged access to social media platforms. Unfortunately, to date there have been no concrete technical proposals to provide such auditing, because auditing at scale risks disclosure of users' private data and platforms' proprietary algorithms. We propose a new method for platform-supported auditing that can meet the goals of the proposed legislation. Our first contribution is to enumerate the challenges of existing auditing methods to implement these policies at scale. Second, we suggest that limited, privileged access to relevance estimators is the key to enabling generalizable platform-supported auditing by external researchers. Third, we show platform-supported auditing need not risk user privacy nor disclosure of platforms' business interests by proposing an auditing framework that protects against these risks. For a particular fairness metric, we show that ensuring privacy imposes only a small constant factor increase (6.34x as an upper bound, and 4x for typical parameters) in the number of samples required for accurate auditing. Our technical contributions, combined with ongoing legal and policy efforts, can enable public oversight into how social media platforms affect individuals and society by moving past the privacy-vs-transparency hurdle.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 18 Jul 2022.
Builds on
No reference list yet.
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
4 papers.
- 2024Secure and Confidential Certificates of Online Fairnesscited by 7
- 2025The Accountability Paradox: How Platform API Restrictions Undermine AI Transparency Mandatescited by 7
- 2024Law and the Emerging Political Economy of Algorithmic Auditscited by 5
- 2026Using AI Agents to Automate Black-Box Audits of Personalization Algorithms at Scalecited by 0
- 2026Using AI Agents to Automate Black-Box Audits of Personalization Algorithms at Scale29 Jun 2026
- 2025The Accountability Paradox: How Platform API Restrictions Undermine AI Transparency Mandates16 May 2025
- 2024Secure and Confidential Certificates of Online Fairness17 Sep 2024
- 2024Law and the Emerging Political Economy of Algorithmic Audits3 Apr 2024