mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

If a Human Can See It, So Should Your System: Reliability Requirements for Machine Vision Components

arXiv 2202.03930 ↗First posted 8 Feb 2022cs.SE cs.CVcited by 11

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Abstract (arXiv)

Machine Vision Components (MVC) are becoming safety-critical. Assuring their quality, including safety, is essential for their successful deployment. Assurance relies on the availability of precisely specified and, ideally, machine-verifiable requirements. MVCs with state-of-the-art performance rely on machine learning (ML) and training data but largely lack such requirements. In this paper, we address the need for defining machine-verifiable reliability requirements for MVCs against transformations that simulate the full range of realistic and safety-critical changes in the environment. Using human performance as a baseline, we define reliability requirements as: 'if the changes in an image do not affect a human's decision, neither should they affect the MVC's.' To this end, we provide: (1) a class of safety-related image transformations; (2) reliability requirement classes to specify correctness-preservation and prediction-preservation for MVCs; (3) a method to instantiate machine-verifiable requirements from these requirements classes using human performance experiment data; (4) human performance experiment data for image recognition involving eight commonly used transformations, from about 2000 human participants; and (5) a method for automatically checking whether an MVC satisfies our requirements. Further, we show that our reliability requirements are feasible and reusable by evaluating our methods on 13 state-of-the-art pre-trained image classification models. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach detects reliability gaps in MVCs that other existing methods are unable to detect.

Key facts. Cited by 11 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 25 of its 58 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Feb 2022.

Builds on

25 of 58 references.

References · 25

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13 more
  1. 2016Measuring Neural Net Robustness with Constraintscited by 90
  2. 2021On the effectiveness of adversarial training against common corruptionscited by 71
  3. 2019Requirements Engineering for Machine Learning: Perspectives from Data Scientistscited by 49
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  6. 2018Identifying Implementation Bugs in Machine Learning based Image Classifiers using Metamorphic Testingcited by 30
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  8. 2021RobOT: Robustness-Oriented Testing for Deep Learning Systemscited by 27
  9. 2017Is Deep Learning Safe for Robot Vision? Adversarial Examples against the iCub Humanoidcited by 19
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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2022: 2; 2023: 1; 2024: 2; 2025: 4; 2026: 2.

11 papers.