mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Compression-Resistant Backdoor Attack against Deep Neural Networks

arXiv 2201.00672 ↗First posted 3 Jan 2022cs.CVcited by 14

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Abstract (arXiv)

In recent years, many backdoor attacks based on training data poisoning have been proposed. However, in practice, those backdoor attacks are vulnerable to image compressions. When backdoor instances are compressed, the feature of specific backdoor trigger will be destroyed, which could result in the backdoor attack performance deteriorating. In this paper, we propose a compression-resistant backdoor attack based on feature consistency training. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first backdoor attack that is robust to image compressions. First, both backdoor images and their compressed versions are input into the deep neural network (DNN) for training. Then, the feature of each image is extracted by internal layers of the DNN. Next, the feature difference between backdoor images and their compressed versions are minimized. As a result, the DNN treats the feature of compressed images as the feature of backdoor images in feature space. After training, the backdoor attack against DNN is robust to image compression. Furthermore, we consider three different image compressions (i.e., JPEG, JPEG2000, WEBP) in feature consistency training, so that the backdoor attack is robust to multiple image compression algorithms. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed backdoor attack. When the backdoor instances are compressed, the attack success rate of common backdoor attack is lower than 10%, while the attack success rate of our compression-resistant backdoor is greater than 97%. The compression-resistant attack is still robust even when the backdoor images are compressed with low compression quality. In addition, extensive experiments have demonstrated that, our compression-resistant backdoor attack has the generalization ability to resist image compression which is not used in the training process.

Key facts. Cited by 14 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 12 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Jan 2022.

Builds on

12 of 37 references.

References · 12

  1. 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 51,809
  2. 2014Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognitioncited by 15,267
  3. 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,012
  4. 2017Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defensescited by 833
  5. 2020Dynamic Backdoor Attacks Against Machine Learning Modelscited by 147
  6. 2018Backdoor Embedding in Convolutional Neural Network Models via Invisible Perturbationcited by 131
  7. 2020Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems in the Physical Worldcited by 129
  8. 2020Deep Feature Space Trojan Attack of Neural Networks by Controlled Detoxificationcited by 93
  9. 2018Backdooring Convolutional Neural Networks via Targeted Weight Perturbationscited by 66
  10. 2021Poison Ink: Robust and Invisible Backdoor Attackcited by 50
  11. 2021Robust Backdoor Attacks against Deep Neural Networks in Real Physical Worldcited by 20
  12. 2021Metric Learning for Anti-Compression Facial Forgery Detectioncited by 9

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 3; 2024: 3; 2025: 3; 2026: 4.

14 papers.

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