WaNet -- Imperceptible Warping-based Backdoor Attack
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Abstract (arXiv)
With the thriving of deep learning and the widespread practice of using pre-trained networks, backdoor attacks have become an increasing security threat drawing many research interests in recent years. A third-party model can be poisoned in training to work well in normal conditions but behave maliciously when a trigger pattern appears. However, the existing backdoor attacks are all built on noise perturbation triggers, making them noticeable to humans. In this paper, we instead propose using warping-based triggers. The proposed backdoor outperforms the previous methods in a human inspection test by a wide margin, proving its stealthiness. To make such models undetectable by machine defenders, we propose a novel training mode, called the ``noise mode. The trained networks successfully attack and bypass the state-of-the-art defense methods on standard classification datasets, including MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and CelebA. Behavior analyses show that our backdoors are transparent to network inspection, further proving this novel attack mechanism's efficiency.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Builds on 8 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 20 Feb 2021.
Builds on
8 of 31 references.
References · 8
- 2016Identity Mappings in Deep Residual Networkscited by 1,962
- 2017BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chaincited by 1,099
- 2017Targeted Backdoor Attacks on Deep Learning Systems Using Data Poisoningcited by 1,047
- 2019STRIP: A Defence Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 456
- 2019A new Backdoor Attack in CNNs by training set corruption without label poisoningcited by 241
- 2020Dynamic Backdoor Attacks Against Machine Learning Modelscited by 151
- 2019Model Agnostic Defence against Backdoor Attacks in Machine Learningcited by 52
- 2019Februus: Input Purification Defense Against Trojan Attacks on Deep Neural Network Systemscited by 27
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 3; 2025: 0; 2026: 1.
4 papers.
- 2024CleanerCLIP: Fine-grained Counterfactual Semantic Augmentation for Backdoor Defense in Contrastive Learningcited by 13
- 2024TinyML Security: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Resource-Constrained Machine Learning Systemscited by 3
- 2024Backdooring Outlier Detection Methods: A Novel Attack Approachcited by 2
- 2026TARE: Weigh a Never-Poisoned Twin Before Reading Backdoor-Defense Costscited by 0
- 2026TARE: Weigh a Never-Poisoned Twin Before Reading Backdoor-Defense Costs4 Oct 2026
- 2024Backdooring Outlier Detection Methods: A Novel Attack Approach6 Dec 2024
- 2024TinyML Security: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Resource-Constrained Machine Learning Systems11 Nov 2024
- 2024CleanerCLIP: Fine-grained Counterfactual Semantic Augmentation for Backdoor Defense in Contrastive Learning26 Sep 2024
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2022Imperceptible Backdoor Attack: From Input Space to Feature Representation
- 2022BackdoorBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark of Backdoor Learning
- 2024ProP: Efficient Backdoor Detection via Propagation Perturbation for Overparametrized Models ↗
- 2024NoiseAttack: An Evasive Sample-Specific Multi-Targeted Backdoor Attack Through White Gaussian Noise
- 2023BackdoorBox: A Python Toolbox for Backdoor Learning
- 2022Training with More Confidence: Mitigating Injected and Natural Backdoors During Training
- 2024A Practical Trigger-Free Backdoor Attack on Neural Networks ↗
- 2023Towards Invisible Backdoor Attacks in the Frequency Domain against Deep Neural Networks ↗