On the Influence of Ageing on Face Morph Attacks: Vulnerability and Detection
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Abstract (arXiv)
Face morphing attacks have raised critical concerns as they demonstrate a new vulnerability of Face Recognition Systems (FRS), which are widely deployed in border control applications. The face morphing process uses the images from multiple data subjects and performs an image blending operation to generate a morphed image of high quality. The generated morphed image exhibits similar visual characteristics corresponding to the biometric characteristics of the data subjects that contributed to the composite image and thus making it difficult for both humans and FRS, to detect such attacks. In this paper, we report a systematic investigation on the vulnerability of the Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) FRS when morphed images under the influence of ageing are presented. To this extent, we have introduced a new morphed face dataset with ageing derived from the publicly available MORPH II face dataset, which we refer to as MorphAge dataset. The dataset has two bins based on age intervals, the first bin - MorphAge-I dataset has 1002 unique data subjects with the age variation of 1 year to 2 years while the MorphAge-II dataset consists of 516 data subjects whose age intervals are from 2 years to 5 years. To effectively evaluate the vulnerability for morphing attacks, we also introduce a new evaluation metric, namely the Fully Mated Morphed Presentation Match Rate (FMMPMR), to quantify the vulnerability effectively in a realistic scenario. Extensive experiments are carried out by using two different COTS FRS (COTS I - Cognitec and COTS II - Neurotechnology) to quantify the vulnerability with ageing. Further, we also evaluate five different Morph Attack Detection (MAD) techniques to benchmark their detection performance with ageing.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 6 Jul 2020.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 2; 2022: 3; 2023: 3; 2024: 1; 2025: 1.
10 papers.
- 2022Morphing Attack Potentialcited by 15
- 2022Deep Composite Face Image Attacks: Generation, Vulnerability and Detectioncited by 6
- 2021Algorithmic Fairness in Face Morphing Attack Detectioncited by 5
- 2023Towards minimizing efforts for Morphing Attacks -- Deep embeddings for morphing pair selection and improved Morphing Attack Detectioncited by 4
- 2021Worst-Case Morphs: a Theoretical and a Practical Approachcited by 3
- 2023Robust Face Morphing Attack Detection Using Fusion of Multiple Features and Classification Techniquescited by 3
- 2023Worst-Case Morphs using Wasserstein ALI and Improved MIPGANcited by 2
- 2024TetraLoss: Improving the Robustness of Face Recognition against Morphing Attackscited by 2
- 2025DOOMGAN:High-Fidelity Dynamic Identity Obfuscation Ocular Generative Morphingcited by 1
- 2022Face Morphing: Fooling a Face Recognition System Is Simple!cited by 0
- 2025DOOMGAN:High-Fidelity Dynamic Identity Obfuscation Ocular Generative Morphing23 Jul 2025
- 2024TetraLoss: Improving the Robustness of Face Recognition against Morphing Attacks21 Jan 2024
- 2023Worst-Case Morphs using Wasserstein ALI and Improved MIPGAN12 Oct 2023
- 2023Towards minimizing efforts for Morphing Attacks -- Deep embeddings for morphing pair selection and improved Morphing Attack Detection29 May 2023
- 2023Robust Face Morphing Attack Detection Using Fusion of Multiple Features and Classification Techniques5 May 2023
- 2022Deep Composite Face Image Attacks: Generation, Vulnerability and Detection20 Nov 2022
- 2022Face Morphing: Fooling a Face Recognition System Is Simple!27 May 2022
- 2022Morphing Attack Potential28 Apr 2022
- 2021Worst-Case Morphs: a Theoretical and a Practical Approach30 Nov 2021
- 2021Algorithmic Fairness in Face Morphing Attack Detection23 Nov 2021