CAN-D: A Modular Four-Step Pipeline for Comprehensively Decoding Controller Area Network Data
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Abstract (arXiv)
CANs are a broadcast protocol for real-time communication of critical vehicle subsystems. Original equipment manufacturers of passenger vehicles hold secret their mappings of CAN data to vehicle signals, and these definitions vary according to make, model, and year. Without these mappings, the wealth of real-time vehicle information hidden in the CAN packets is uninterpretable, impeding vehicle-related research. Guided by the 4-part CAN signal definition, we present CAN-D (CAN-Decoder), a modular, 4-step pipeline for identifying each signal's boundaries (start bit, length), endianness (byte order), signedness (bit-to-integer encoding), and by leveraging diagnostic standards, augmenting a subset of the extracted signals with physical interpretation. We provide a comprehensive review of the CAN signal reverse engineering research. Previous methods ignore endianness and signedness, rendering them incapable of decoding many standard CAN signal definitions. Incorporating endianness grows the search space from 128 to 4.72E21 signal tokenizations and introduces a web of changing dependencies. We formulate, formally analyze, and provide an efficient solution to an optimization problem, allowing identification of the optimal set of signal boundaries and byte orderings. We provide two novel, state-of-the-art signal boundary classifiers-both superior to previous approaches in precision and recall in three different test scenarios-and the first signedness classification algorithm which exhibits a >97% F-score. CAN-D is the only solution with the potential to extract any CAN signal. In evaluation on 10 vehicles, CAN-D's average ℓ1 error is 5x better than all previous methods and exhibits lower ave. error, even when considering only signals that meet prior methods' assumptions. CAN-D is implemented in lightweight hardware, allowing for an OBD-II plugin for real-time in-vehicle CAN decoding.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 9 Jun 2020.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 2; 2023: 1; 2024: 3; 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
9 papers.
- 2022CANShield: Deep Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Framework for Controller Area Networks at the Signal-Levelcited by 8
- 2021Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Benchmarkcited by 6
- 2022Detecting CAN Masquerade Attacks with Signal Clustering Similaritycited by 5
- 2024Evaluating lightweight unsupervised online IDS for masquerade attacks in CANcited by 3
- 2024Detecting Masquerade Attacks in Controller Area Networks Using Graph Machine Learningcited by 1
- 2023STATGRAPH: Effective In-vehicle Intrusion Detection via Multi-view Statistical Graph Learningcited by 0
- 2024ByCAN: Reverse Engineering Controller Area Network (CAN) Messages from Bit to Byte Levelcited by 0
- 2025Temporal cross-validation impacts multivariate time series subsequence anomaly detection evaluationcited by 0
- 2026CAN We Trust Your Results? A Cross-Dataset Study of Automotive IDS Evaluationcited by 0
- 2026CAN We Trust Your Results? A Cross-Dataset Study of Automotive IDS Evaluation29 Jun 2026
- 2025Temporal cross-validation impacts multivariate time series subsequence anomaly detection evaluation13 Jun 2025
- 2024ByCAN: Reverse Engineering Controller Area Network (CAN) Messages from Bit to Byte Level17 Aug 2024
- 2024Detecting Masquerade Attacks in Controller Area Networks Using Graph Machine Learning10 Aug 2024
- 2024Evaluating lightweight unsupervised online IDS for masquerade attacks in CAN19 Jun 2024
- 2023STATGRAPH: Effective In-vehicle Intrusion Detection via Multi-view Statistical Graph Learning13 Nov 2023
- 2022CANShield: Deep Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Framework for Controller Area Networks at the Signal-Level3 May 2022
- 2022Detecting CAN Masquerade Attacks with Signal Clustering Similarity7 Jan 2022
- 2021Time-Based CAN Intrusion Detection Benchmark14 Jan 2021