LEAP: A Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol for In-Vehicle Communications
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Abstract (arXiv)
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is considered as the de-facto standard for the in-vehicle communications due to its real-time performance and high reliability. Unfortunately, the lack of security protection on the CAN bus gives attackers the opportunity to remotely compromise a vehicle. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) with low cost and high efficiency to address the security issue of the CAN bus. LEAP exploits the security-enhanced stream cipher primitive to provide encryption and authentication for the CAN messages. Compared with the state-of-the-art Message Authentication Code (MAC) based approaches, LEAP requires less memory, is 8X faster, and thwarts the most recently proposed attacks.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2019.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 0; 2023: 1; 2024: 1.
3 papers.
- 2021A Reinforcement Learning Approach for GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection of Autonomous Vehiclescited by 3
- 2024Graph-Powered Defense: Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection for Unmanned Aerial Vehiclescited by 1
- 2023STATGRAPH: Effective In-vehicle Intrusion Detection via Multi-view Statistical Graph Learningcited by 0
- 2024Graph-Powered Defense: Controller Area Network Intrusion Detection for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles3 Dec 2024
- 2023STATGRAPH: Effective In-vehicle Intrusion Detection via Multi-view Statistical Graph Learning13 Nov 2023
- 2021A Reinforcement Learning Approach for GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection of Autonomous Vehicles19 Aug 2021