Deep Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
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Abstract (arXiv)
In this paper, we study the design of deep learning-powered iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). We build on prior work where preference elicitation was done via kernelized support vector regressions (SVRs). However, the SVR-based approach has limitations because it requires solving a machine learning (ML)-based winner determination problem (WDP). With expressive kernels (like gaussians), the ML-based WDP cannot be solved for large domains. While linear or quadratic kernels have better computational scalability, these kernels have limited expressiveness. In this work, we address these shortcomings by using deep neural networks (DNNs) instead of SVRs. We first show how the DNN-based WDP can be reformulated into a mixed integer program (MIP). Second, we experimentally compare the prediction performance of DNNs against SVRs. Third, we present experimental evaluations in two medium-sized domains which show that even ICAs based on relatively small-sized DNNs lead to higher economic efficiency than ICAs based on kernelized SVRs. Finally, we show that our DNN-powered ICA also scales well to very large CA domains.
Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 12 Jul 2019.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 2; 2022: 5; 2023: 1; 2024: 2; 2025: 2.
12 papers.
- 2022Optimal-er Auctions through Attentioncited by 26
- 2022Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctionscited by 21
- 2021NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertaintycited by 16
- 2021Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matchingcited by 14
- 2022Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platformscited by 9
- 2022Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignmentcited by 9
- 2025Accelerated Preference Elicitation with LLM-Based Proxiescited by 9
- 2025LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignmentcited by 7
- 2023Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auctioncited by 4
- 2022Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocationcited by 3
- 2024Prices, Bids, Values: One ML-Powered Combinatorial Auction to Rule Them Allcited by 2
- 2024Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applicationscited by 0
- 2025LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment14 Feb 2025
- 2025Accelerated Preference Elicitation with LLM-Based Proxies24 Jan 2025
- 2024Prices, Bids, Values: One ML-Powered Combinatorial Auction to Rule Them All14 Nov 2024
- 2024Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications11 Jan 2024
- 2023Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auction20 Aug 2023
- 2022Machine Learning-Powered Course Allocation3 Oct 2022
- 2022Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment31 Aug 2022
- 2022Optimal-er Auctions through Attention26 Feb 2022
- 2022Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms15 Feb 2022
- 2022Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions6 Feb 2022
- 2021Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching15 Jun 2021
- 2021NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty26 Feb 2021