State-of-the-Art Survey on In-Vehicle Network Communication (CAN-Bus) Security and Vulnerabilities
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Abstract (arXiv)
Nowadays with the help of advanced technology, modern vehicles are not only made up of mechanical devices but also consist of highly complex electronic devices and connections to the outside world. There are around 70 Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicle which are communicating with each other over the standard communication protocol known as Controller Area Network (CAN-Bus) that provides the communication rate up to 1Mbps. There are different types of in-vehicle network protocol and bus system namely Controlled Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnected Network (LIN), Media Oriented System Transport (MOST), and FlexRay. Even though CAN-Bus is considered as de-facto standard for in-vehicle network communication, it inherently lacks the fundamental security features by design like message authentication. This security limitation has paved the way for adversaries to penetrate into the vehicle network and do malicious activities which can pose a dangerous situation for both driver and passengers. In particular, nowadays vehicular networks are not only closed systems, but also they are open to different external interfaces namely Bluetooth, GPS, to the outside world. Therefore, it creates new opportunities for attackers to remotely take full control of the vehicle. The objective of this research is to survey the current limitations of CAN-Bus protocol in terms of secure communication and different solutions that researchers in the society of automotive have provided to overcome the CAN-Bus limitation on different layers.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 5 Feb 2018.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 0; 2023: 0; 2024: 2; 2025: 3; 2026: 1.
7 papers.
- 2021Deep Transfer Learning Based Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicular Networkscited by 10
- 2024CARACAS: vehiCular ArchitectuRe for detAiled Can Attacks Simulationcited by 0
- 2024ByCAN: Reverse Engineering Controller Area Network (CAN) Messages from Bit to Byte Levelcited by 0
- 2025SDN-Based False Data Detection With Its Mitigation and Machine Learning Robustness for In-Vehicle Networkscited by 0
- 2025Assessing the Resilience of Automotive Intrusion Detection Systems to Adversarial Manipulationcited by 0
- 2025Temporal Misalignment Attacks against Multimodal Perception in Autonomous Drivingcited by 0
- 2026CAN We Trust Your Results? A Cross-Dataset Study of Automotive IDS Evaluationcited by 0
- 2026CAN We Trust Your Results? A Cross-Dataset Study of Automotive IDS Evaluation29 Jun 2026
- 2025Temporal Misalignment Attacks against Multimodal Perception in Autonomous Driving12 Jul 2025
- 2025Assessing the Resilience of Automotive Intrusion Detection Systems to Adversarial Manipulation12 Jun 2025
- 2025SDN-Based False Data Detection With Its Mitigation and Machine Learning Robustness for In-Vehicle Networks6 Jun 2025
- 2024ByCAN: Reverse Engineering Controller Area Network (CAN) Messages from Bit to Byte Level17 Aug 2024
- 2024CARACAS: vehiCular ArchitectuRe for detAiled Can Attacks Simulation11 Jun 2024
- 2021Deep Transfer Learning Based Intrusion Detection System for Electric Vehicular Networks12 Jul 2021