Infinite-Duration Bidding Games
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Abstract (arXiv)
Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods as they model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several common modes to determine how the players move the token through the graph; e.g., in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study the em bidding mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied in infinite-duration games. The following bidding rule was previously defined and called Richman bidding. Both players have separate em budgets, which sum up to 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place: Both players submit bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget, and the higher bidder pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. The central question studied in bidding games is a necessary and sufficient initial budget for winning the game: a em threshold budget in a vertex is a value t ∈ [0,1] such that if Player 1's budget exceeds t, he can win the game, and if Player 2's budget exceeds 1-t, he can win the game. Threshold budgets were previously shown to exist in every vertex of a reachability game, which have an interesting connection with em random-turn games -- a sub-class of simple stochastic games in which the player who moves is chosen randomly. We show the existence of threshold budgets for a qualitative class of infinite-duration games, namely parity games, and a quantitative class, namely mean-payoff games. The key component of the proof is a quantitative solution to strongly-connected mean-payoff bidding games in which we extend the connection with random-turn games to these games, and construct explicit optimal strategies for both players.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 3 May 2017.
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Citing papers per year: 2023: 2; 2024: 0; 2025: 0; 2026: 2.
4 papers.
- 2023Auction-Based Schedulingcited by 1
- 2023Reachability Poorman Discrete-Bidding Gamescited by 0
- 2026How Much Can a Few Engine Moves Help? Quantifying Limited Cheating in Chesscited by 0
- 2026Auction-Based Online Policy Adaptation for Evolving Objectivescited by 0
- 2026Auction-Based Online Policy Adaptation for Evolving Objectives2 Apr 2026
- 2026How Much Can a Few Engine Moves Help? Quantifying Limited Cheating in Chess8 Jan 2026
- 2023Auction-Based Scheduling18 Oct 2023
- 2023Reachability Poorman Discrete-Bidding Games27 Jul 2023