APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare. Cole and Gkatzelis recently proved that this problem admits a constant factor approximation. We complement their result by showing that this problem is APX-hard.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 5 Jul 2015.
Builds on
No reference list yet.
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 1; 2023: 0; 2024: 0; 2025: 0; 2026: 1.
3 papers.