A Multiagent Reinforcement Learning Algorithm with Non-linear Dynamics
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Abstract (arXiv)
Several multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms have been proposed to optimize agents decisions. Due to the complexity of the problem, the majority of the previously developed MARL algorithms assumed agents either had some knowledge of the underlying game (such as Nash equilibria) and/or observed other agents actions and the rewards they received. We introduce a new MARL algorithm called the Weighted Policy Learner (WPL), which allows agents to reach a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in benchmark 2-player-2-action games with minimum knowledge. Using WPL, the only feedback an agent needs is its own local reward (the agent does not observe other agents actions or rewards). Furthermore, WPL does not assume that agents know the underlying game or the corresponding Nash Equilibrium a priori. We experimentally show that our algorithm converges in benchmark two-player-two-action games. We also show that our algorithm converges in the challenging Shapleys game where previous MARL algorithms failed to converge without knowing the underlying game or the NE. Furthermore, we show that WPL outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms in a more realistic setting of 100 agents interacting and learning concurrently. An important aspect of understanding the behavior of a MARL algorithm is analyzing the dynamics of the algorithm: how the policies of multiple learning agents evolve over time as agents interact with one another. Such an analysis not only verifies whether agents using a given MARL algorithm will eventually converge, but also reveals the behavior of the MARL algorithm prior to convergence. We analyze our algorithm in two-player-two-action games and show that symbolically proving WPLs convergence is difficult, because of the non-linear nature of WPLs dynamics, unlike previous MARL algorithms that had either linear or piece-wise-linear dynamics. Instead, we numerically solve WPLs dynamics differential equations and compare the solution to the dynamics of previous MARL algorithms.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 15 Jan 2014.
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Citing papers per year: 2018: 1; 2019: 0; 2020: 0; 2021: 1; 2022: 0; 2023: 1; 2024: 0; 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
5 papers.
- 2021Gradient play in stochastic games: stationary points, convergence, and sample complexitycited by 32
- 2025Faster Rates for No-Regret Learning in General Games via Cautious Optimismcited by 10
- 2018Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Certain General-sum Stochastic Gamescited by 4
- 2023Chaos persists in large-scale multi-agent learning despite adaptive learning ratescited by 0
- 2026Interpretable Failure Analysis in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Systemscited by 0
- 2026Interpretable Failure Analysis in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Systems8 Feb 2026
- 2025Faster Rates for No-Regret Learning in General Games via Cautious Optimism31 Mar 2025
- 2023Chaos persists in large-scale multi-agent learning despite adaptive learning rates1 Jun 2023
- 2021Gradient play in stochastic games: stationary points, convergence, and sample complexity1 Jun 2021
- 2018Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Certain General-sum Stochastic Games26 Jun 2018