mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

AutoSec-RAN: Specification-Grounded LLM Fine-Tuning for Automated Security Analysis of O-RAN

arXiv 2610.15995 ↗First posted 11 Oct 2026cs.CR cs.AI eess.SPcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

This paper presents AutoSec-RAN, a specification-grounded large language model (LLM) framework for automated security triage of Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) testing. Unlike approaches relying on static rule sets or privileged access to raw packet captures, AutoSec-RAN fine-tunes Mistral-7B-Instruct through two Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) stages over a curated corpus of 69 O-RAN, 3GPP, and adjacent standards documents, then selectively augments inference with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) over the same specification index. At inference, the model receives only an investigator-style question and a scenario metadata block, simulating an automated analyst operating without raw packet evidence. AutoSec-RAN is validated on a purpose-built 5G/O-RAN testbed across labeled fronthaul distributed denial of service replay scenarios. A Gemma-4-31B judge LLM scores each candidate's answer on faithfulness, correctness, and actionability relative to a reference authored from full packet capture and log evidence. AutoSec-RAN achieves a mean judge overall score of 0.713 across all 313 evaluation items (0.755 restricted to the five supervised taxonomy classes), clearing the 0.70 reporting threshold, and a blended score of 0.778 (0.808 supervised-only) when cosine similarity over Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence (BAAI) General Embedding (BGE) is incorporated as a secondary semantic signal. The framework performs strongest on mitigation and threat-model reasoning (with a mean overall of 0.849 and 0.848, respectively) and identifies a measurable gap on the held-out attack-direction class (0.515), a controlled result that exposes a specific training data requirement. These results establish specification-grounded LoRA fine-tuning combined with RAG retrieval as a viable foundation for automated security validation of AI-native O-RAN.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 10 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Oct 2026.

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10 of 22 references.

References · 10

  1. 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,380
  2. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
  3. 2024TSpec-LLM: An Open-source Dataset for LLM Understanding of 3GPP Specificationscited by 27
  4. 2024ORAN-Bench-13K: An Open Source Benchmark for Assessing LLMs in Open Radio Access Networkscited by 24
  5. 2022Prototyping Next-Generation O-RAN Research Testbeds with SDRscited by 4
  6. 2025AI5GTest: AI-Driven Specification-Aware Automated Testing and Validation of 5G O-RAN Componentscited by 4
  7. 2023End-to-End O-RAN Security Architecture, Threat Surface, Coverage, and the Case of the Open Fronthaulcited by 2
  8. 2024Soft Tester UE: A Novel Approach for Open RAN Security Testingcited by 1
  9. 2025RAN Tester UE: An Automated Declarative UE Centric Security Testing Platformcited by 1
  10. 2025From Description to Detection: LLM based Extendable O-RAN Compliant Blind DoS Detection in 5G and Beyondcited by 1

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