Spatial Pattern Formation from Multi-Agent Learning in Public Goods Dilemmas

Spatial public goods models show that prescribed movement toward richer locations can generate spatial patterns. We ask how such patterns emerge when agents learn where to move and how learning rates shape their consequences for collective welfare. Fixed populations of cooperators and defectors independently learn movement policies using tabular Q-learning and local observations. Cooperator learning generates clusters around resource peaks, while co-adaptation changes their strength and motion. At a fixed training budget, the largest welfare losses occur when cooperators learn at high rates and defectors at low rates. In part of this regime, learned policies also generate traveling bands supported by a shared directional preference. The conditions supporting travel change with further training, so these patterns reflect training history rather than an established asymptotic outcome. Across the tested learning-rate conditions with cooperator learning, mean collective welfare falls below random movement because increased crowding outweighs gains in resource benefit. Charging agents for the crowding they impose on others during learning recovers much of the welfare loss in the tested conditions. These results connect learning rates to the emergence and welfare costs of spatial organization driven by individual rewards.