Who Bears the Burden? Learning Responsibility for Shared Constraints in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
When multiple agents share a cost budget, a common Lagrange multiplier can enforce the aggregate constraint but does not determine how its penalty should be allocated across agents. Uniform penalties ignore heterogeneity in the rewards agents sacrifice, while agent-specific multipliers may still rely on the same aggregate cost signal. We introduce Lagrangian Responsibility Allocation (LiRA), which learns each agent's share of a common multiplier by optimizing social welfare over a finite training horizon. The multiplier enforces the aggregate budget, while responsibility shares redistribute its influence without modifying the original rewards or constraints. For convex games under standard regularity conditions, varying these shares induces a smooth family of normalized generalized Nash equilibria in which active constraints remain at their budgets while welfare varies. To optimize responsibility before convergence, we derive a welfare gradient that accounts for both learning updates and the induced change in data distribution. Across CityLearn, MABIM, Harvest, and MetaDrive, spanning 3 to 400 agents, LiRA improves average social welfare by up to 29% over uniform and agent-specific multiplier baselines. Grid and driving costs remain within budget, inventory violations decrease, and Harvest makes more effective use of available budget.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 11 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2026.
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References · 11
- 2017Proximal Policy Optimization Algorithmscited by 15,215
- 2019Generalized Inner Loop Meta-Learningcited by 93
- 2022Melting Pot 2.0cited by 40
- 2021Multi-Agent Constrained Policy Optimisationcited by 35
- 2020DeepMind Lab2Dcited by 13
- 2023A Versatile Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Benchmark for Inventory Managementcited by 10
- 2024Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Convergence to Generalized Nash Equilibriumcited by 6
- 2022An Investigation of the Bias-Variance Tradeoff in Meta-Gradientscited by 5
- 2024Learning responsibility allocations for multi-agent interactions: A differentiable optimization approach with control barrier functionscited by 3
- 2026Deep Incentive Design with Differentiable Equilibrium Blockscited by 2
- 2025Generalized Nash Equilibrium Solutions in Dynamic Games With Shared Constraintscited by 1
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- 2026Scalable Constrained Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning via State Augmentation and Consensus for Separable Dynamics