mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Measurement-First Auditing of Agentic Leaderboards: Contamination Susceptibility, Matched-Control Re-evaluation, and Scorer Validation

arXiv 2610.05830 ↗First posted 5 Oct 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Agentic leaderboards increasingly evaluate systems on public benchmarks whose task statements and solution-bearing artifacts can remain accessible. We propose a measurement-first audit framework that distinguishes contamination claims according to the evidence required to support them. It separates three channels that require different evidence: training-time exposure, evaluation-time retrieval, and pipeline/scaffold leakage. Each channel is coded as open, partial, closed, or unknown under a fail-closed rule. Across nine Holistic Agent Leaderboard (HAL) configurations, none of the 27 channel assessments was coded closed, but incidents were confirmed in four configurations. We then apply the behavioral component of the framework to a reported file-localization gap on SWE-bench Verified, using an outcome-blind, same-repository matched-control design with symmetric prompt-leakage screening, paired and repository-aware uncertainty analyses, and scorer validation, evaluated on GPT-4.1 and DeepSeek-V4-Flash. Among the 100 pairs retained after symmetric screening and the pair-integrity exclusion, GPT-4.1 showed a +10.0-point pair-weighted Top-3 benchmark-associated gap, but the 95% intervals from both the prespecified paired-bootstrap procedure and the post-hoc repository-balanced analysis included zero, leaving the benchmark-associated gap inconclusive. The reproduction scorer did not pass its validation gate: against consensus human labels, sufficient scorer sensitivity could not be established for either model, and both DeepSeek-V4-Flash firings on correct-gold comparisons were false positives. Without provenance evidence, appropriate controls, symmetric leakage screening, and validated scorers, stronger contamination claims are not warranted. The results do not establish training-data membership, contamination prevalence, or benchmark-induced score inflation.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2026.

Builds on

No reference list yet.

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Maintaining Benchmarks Against Increasingly Capable Agents: Detection and Remediation of Unearned Passes
  2. 2026Do Agent Benchmarks Measure Capability? Protocol Validity in the Age of Agentic AI
  3. 2026Coding Agents Have Converged: Why the SWE-bench Leaderboard Can No Longer Order Its Top Entries, and What to Measure Instead
  4. 2026The Double Measurement Confound in Agent Benchmarks: De-Scaffolding, Ground-Truth Scoring, and Reliability Beyond the Mean
  5. 2026BenchShield: Formal Model-Backed Instrumentation for Reward Integrity in LLM-Agent Evaluation Infrastructure
  6. 2026Agent Evaluation Reliability: More Tasks Won't (Always) Fix An Agent Leaderboard
  7. 2026AgentAtlas: Beyond Outcome Leaderboards for LLM Agents
  8. 2026What Does an LLM-Agent Leaderboard Rank Actually Compare?