mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Localize-and-Detect: Auditing Task-Level Poisoning in Instruction-Tuned Models

arXiv 2610.03960 ↗First posted 2 Oct 2026cs.CR cs.LGcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Instruction fine-tuning adapts a pretrained language model to follow instructions by training it on instruction--response pairs from a collection of tasks, such as summarization and question answering. Task-level poisoning exploits this task structure to manipulate the fine-tuned model into producing attacker-specified biased content on a particular target task, without requiring an explicit input trigger. Detecting such attacks is challenging because there is no explicit trigger to identify, the target task and biased content are unknown, and benign fine-tuning itself changes model behavior. We introduce Localize-and-Detect, a two-stage black-box auditing method for task-level poisoning that requires only outputs from both the base and fine-tuned models. In the first stage, we localize the target task by identifying candidate tasks on which the fine-tuned and base models have the largest differences in their next-token distributions. In the second stage, we search the shortlisted tasks for biased content that repeatedly appears in the fine-tuned model's responses but not in those of the base model. We evaluate Localize-and-Detect on 216 poisoned models across two model families, varying the target task, poisoning mode, poison budget, and type of biased content. Our evaluation demonstrates that Localize-and-Detect can effectively localize target tasks and detect biased content across a range of poisoning settings and models, with detection that tracks attack success and few false positives on clean models.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 27 of its 39 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Oct 2026.

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27 of 39 references.

References · 27

  1. 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,380
  2. 2022Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPTcited by 2,691
  3. 2024Tulu 3: Pushing Frontiers in Open Language Model Post-Trainingcited by 1,053
  4. 2022Super-NaturalInstructions: Generalization via Declarative Instructions on 1600+ NLP Taskscited by 868
  5. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
  6. 2018Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networkscited by 519
  7. 2023Poisoning Language Models During Instruction Tuningcited by 269
  8. 2023Backdooring Instruction-Tuned Large Language Models with Virtual Prompt Injectioncited by 157
  9. 2023Universal Jailbreak Backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedbackcited by 128
  10. 2023On the Exploitability of Instruction Tuningcited by 116
  11. 2023Instructions as Backdoors: Backdoor Vulnerabilities of Instruction Tuning for Large Language Modelscited by 110
  12. 2024BEEAR: Embedding-based Adversarial Removal of Safety Backdoors in Instruction-tuned Language Modelscited by 58
15 more
  1. 2024Unlearning Backdoor Attacks for LLMs with Weak-to-Strong Knowledge Distillationcited by 27
  2. 2024CleanGen: Mitigating Backdoor Attacks for Generation Tasks in Large Language Modelscited by 24
  3. 2025Probe before You Talk: Towards Black-box Defense against Backdoor Unalignment for Large Language Modelscited by 19
  4. 2026The Trigger in the Haystack: Extracting and Reconstructing LLM Backdoor Triggerscited by 14
  5. 2024CLIBE: Detecting Dynamic Backdoors in Transformer-based NLP Modelscited by 13
  6. 2024Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language Modelscited by 9
  7. 2024Gracefully Filtering Backdoor Samples for Generative Large Language Models without Retrainingcited by 9
  8. 2025Cascading Adversarial Bias from Injection to Distillation in Language Modelscited by 9
  9. 2025ConfGuard: A Simple and Effective Backdoor Detection for Large Language Modelscited by 9
  10. 2024Concept-ROT: Poisoning Concepts in Large Language Models with Model Editingcited by 8
  11. 2024Data-centric NLP Backdoor Defense from the Lens of Memorizationcited by 6
  12. 2025P2P: A Poison-to-Poison Remedy for Reliable Backdoor Defense in LLMscited by 6
  13. 2025Detecting Stealthy Backdoor Samples based on Intra-class Distance for Large Language Modelscited by 3
  14. 2026Merging Triggers, Breaking Backdoors: Defensive Poisoning for Instruction-Tuned Language Modelscited by 3
  15. 2026PoisonForge: Task-Level Targeted Poisoning Benchmark for Instruction-Tuned LLMscited by 3

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