mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Bounded Reachability & Jailbreak Detection via Contraction-Constrained State Space Models

arXiv 2610.02853 ↗First posted 2 Oct 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails also fits: Jailbreaking

Abstract (arXiv)

Safety heads are lightweight classifiers attached to pretrained language models for flagging harmful inputs before generation. Their empirical detection performance has been studied, but their formal robustness properties remain largely unexplored. We ask when a State Space Model (SSM)-based safety head can be certified to produce the same prediction for all inputs within a bounded embedding-space perturbation. We prove that the answer turns on a single condition: the l_∞ norm of the state transition matrix must satisfy normA_∞<1 (the contraction condition), which enables exact interval bound propagation (IBP) certification for linear time-invariant classifiers. When the contraction condition holds, the reachable output interval has bounded steady-state width and examples can be certified as robustly classified. When it fails, the interval grows exponentially with sequence length and certification is impossible at any practical perturbation radius. We enforce contraction with a hinge penalty and show on toxic comment data that certified fraction improves from 41% to 59%, with a sharp empirical phase transition at normA_∞=1 matching the theory. Applying a contraction-regularized S4 head to jailbreak detection on JailbreakBench, we achieve a zero-shot transfer to AdvBench (DR=0.994) and HarmBench (DR=0.988). A logistic regression on mean-pooled Mamba-130M embeddings matches or exceeds the S4 head on every detection metric, confirming that harmful intent is already linearly separable in the embedding space. The S4 safety head's contribution is not superior discrimination but the formal certification that no probe-based approach provides.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. First posted on arXiv 2 Oct 2026.

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