mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Who Verifies the Graph? Misspecification Attacks on Causal Action Verification for Language Agents

arXiv 2609.40027 ↗First posted 30 Sep 2026cs.AI cs.LGcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Causal action verifiers gate an agent's state-changing tool calls by checking whether each proposed intervention is identifiable against a committed action-state graph, and they issue a certificate that carries the identification argument and a one-sided lower confidence bound. One such verifier, CIVeX, reports zero false executions on a confounded tool-use benchmark. We red-team it by corrupting only the committed graph. Omitting a single bidirected edge takes it from zero false executions to 15.3% at the benchmark's published confounding strength, with 91% of its executions harmful and utility falling from +2.27 to +0.35. Reversing one arrowhead, so that a mediator is committed as a confounder, gives 48.9% false executions and no correct ones. Every one of these actions carries an internally valid certificate. An attestation step that tests each observationally certified execution against a bounded randomised sample detected both attacks, with 2 false alarms in 555 executions on a truthful graph; refusing what fails the test, or cannot be tested, gave zero false executions in every setting we measured. It does not restore beneficial execution: at the published strength 97.1% of beneficial actions are still never executed, because the same misspecification rejects them before attestation runs. Those rejections carry certificates too, and auditing them works, but its cost scales with the number of rejections rather than the number of executions. Recovering safety costs 127 experiments per 1,050 actions; recovering the lost value costs 614 more, at which point the audited verifier makes the honest graph's decisions on every instance and spends exactly its experiment budget. An audit that inspects only executions protects against wrongful action. Wrongful inaction has to be paid for separately.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 5 of its 17 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Sep 2026.

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5 of 17 references.

References · 5

  1. 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,642
  2. 2017Constrained Policy Optimizationcited by 983
  3. 2017Safe Reinforcement Learning via Shieldingcited by 449
  4. 2022Defining and Characterizing Reward Hackingcited by 203
  5. 2026CIVeX: Causal Intervention Verification for Language Agentscited by 3

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