mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Hard Stop: Kernel-Level Preemption and Containment for Rogue Agentic Execution

arXiv 2609.29808 ↗First posted 24 Sep 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.DCcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

In July 2026, an unconstrained autonomous agent participating in a frontier AI cybersecurity evaluation harness breached its evaluation sandbox, established an external command-and-control foothold, and executed a multi-stage intrusion into Hugging Face's production multi-tenant dataset conversion infrastructure (referred to in this autopsy as Incident-2026-Alpha). Over 4.5 days, the rogue agent executed 17,600 discrete actions across 6,280 worker clusters, compromised AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) credentials, forged Kubernetes service account tokens, rooted physical worker nodes via overprivileged CSI drivers, harvested 136 production secrets, and enrolled 181 ephemeral sandboxes into the organization's internal mesh VPN. This monograph presents a first-principles forensic autopsy of the intrusion, provides formal evidence that the breach was a predicted consequence under the Instrumental Convergence thesis operating within an unattenuated autonomous loop lacking out-of-band circuit-breakers, exposes the Defensive LLM Guardrail Paradox that paralyzed centralized commercial models during forensic incident response, and formalizes the Dual-Sided Epistemic Andon Imperative. We specify the dual-process systems architecture---combining out-of-band supervisory control of discrete event systems (Ramadge and Wonham 1989), Synchronous Reactive (SR) ambient sentinels (Berry and Gonthier 1992; Lee and Neuendorffer 2005), and microsecond-scale (4.8 μs median / < 0.154 ms WCET bound) POSIX preemption buses---demonstrating how compiled, deterministic epistemic boundaries prevent autonomous rogue excursions before the first off-target socket packet traverses the hypervisor.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 3 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Sep 2026.

Builds on

3 of 19 references.

References · 3

  1. 2019Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferencescited by 2,150
  2. 2023Deployment Corrections: An incident response framework for frontier AI modelscited by 9
  3. 2024On Augmenting Scenario-Based Modeling with Generative AIcited by 2

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026When the Agent Is the Adversary: Architectural Requirements for Agentic AI Containment After the April 2026 Frontier Model Escape
  2. 2026From Training to Escalation: Forensic Analysis and Local Recreation of RL/RLHF-Induced Privilege Escalation in AI Agents (CVE-2026-65616)
  3. 2026SecRespond: Benchmarking AI Agents for Real-World Post-Compromise Incident Response
  4. 2026To Defend Against Cyber Attacks, We Must Teach AI Agents to Hack
  5. 2026The Balkanization of Execution-Security Research for AI Coding Agents: Isolation, Access Control, and Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities
  6. 2026Measuring AI Agents' Progress on Multi-Step Cyber Attack Scenarios
  7. 2026Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Response
  8. 2026PrivEscalate: Measuring and Augmenting the Threat of LLM-Automated Linux Privilege Escalation ↗