Not All 4-bit Quantizers Are Equal: Deployment-Time Mitigation of PII Leakage in Fine-Tuned Small Language Models
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Organizations fine-tune small language models on private data and then compress them to 4 bits for resource-efficient deployment. We show that the compression method also affects privacy. What separates the methods is not the bit width but whether they tune their rounding on a small sample of text, the calibration corpus. On our primary model, when each planted record's own opening text is used as the prompt, the two calibration-based methods we test, Activation-aware Weight Quantization (AWQ) and Gradient-based Post-Training Quantization (GPTQ), each reproduce none of the planted records, while the calibration-corpus-free GGUF Q4_K_M format reproduces 5.3% of them. Tracked across five open models with 0.5-7 billion parameters, AWQ leaks least at every size and in both families, with little accuracy loss at 3-7 billion. Controlled experiments associate the difference with calibration-induced rounding error in channels involved in rare-token prediction. Choosing the 4-bit method is therefore a deployment-time privacy decision, not only a question of speed and quality.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 19 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Aug 2026.
Builds on
19 of 20 references.
References · 19
- 2018Think you have Solved Question Answering? Try ARC, the AI2 Reasoning Challengecited by 4,710
- 2022GPTQ: Accurate Post-Training Quantization for Generative Pre-trained Transformerscited by 1,838
- 2023AWQ: Activation-aware Weight Quantization for LLM Compression and Accelerationcited by 1,234
- 2021Membership Inference Attacks From First Principlescited by 839
- 2022Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Modelscited by 755
- 2020Inverting Gradients -- How easy is it to break privacy in federated learning?cited by 707
- 2024MUSE: Machine Unlearning Six-Way Evaluation for Language Modelscited by 251
- 2024Do Membership Inference Attacks Work on Large Language Models?cited by 188
- 2024Stealing Part of a Production Language Modelcited by 152
- 2024LLM Dataset Inference: Did you train on my dataset?cited by 107
- 2022Preventing Verbatim Memorization in Language Models Gives a False Sense of Privacycited by 97
- 2024SoK: Membership Inference Attacks on LLMs are Rushing Nowhere (and How to Fix It)cited by 54
7 more
- 2023Exploring Memorization in Fine-tuned Language Modelscited by 44
- 2024Measuring memorization in language models via probabilistic extractioncited by 40
- 2025Sustainable LLM Inference for Edge AI: Evaluating Quantized LLMs for Energy Efficiency, Output Accuracy, and Inference Latencycited by 32
- 2026Which Quantization Should I Use? A Unified Evaluation of llama.cpp Quantization on Llama-3.1-8B-Instructcited by 7
- 2025Leaner Training, Lower Leakage: Revisiting Memorization in LLM Fine-Tuning with LoRAcited by 3
- 2025How Quantization Impacts Privacy Risk on LLMs for Code?cited by 3
- 2026Decomposing Memorization Reduction in Privacy-Preserving Fine-Tuning of SLMs for CSIRTscited by 1
Built on by
Not cited yet.