Fusing Spectral Signatures and Activation Clustering for Backdoor Detection in Healthcare Imaging Models: Method, Implementation, and Evaluation
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Abstract (arXiv)
Machine learning models are increasingly deployed in healthcare imaging pipelines for diagnostic support, and training-time attacks against them are a named sector-level concern: healthcare-sector guidance identifies model poisoning and adversarial attacks as threats requiring dedicated defenses, while federal policy directs expanded AI vulnerability-detection tooling to critical infrastructure operators such as rural hospitals. Spectral signature analysis and activation clustering are two established backdoor detection methods routinely evaluated as independent baselines, but their outputs are not ordinarily combined, and reported detection performance on medical imaging benchmarks remains sparse relative to the natural-image setting. This paper contributes three things: a score-level fusion rule combining per-class spectral ranking with activation-clustering flags into a single per-sample poisoning score and a model-level agreement statistic; an open-source implementation of the resulting eight-stage pipeline; and an evaluation of that pipeline against synthetically poisoned variants of a public medical imaging benchmark and CIFAR-10 at four poisoning rates (0%, 1%, 5%, 10%) over five seeds each, measuring each detector alone against the fusion. On the medical benchmark, the fused detector reaches AUROC >= 0.99 at every nonzero poisoning rate tested. On CIFAR-10, fusion does not uniformly help: at 10% poisoning, activation clustering's true-positive rate collapses to 0.000 and spectral AUROC independently degrades to near-chance (0.545), despite a 97.2% attack success rate confirming the backdoor was fully installed. The fused score, a weighted combination of both signals, inherits this joint failure. Detection output is expressed in NIST AI RMF Measure-function and MITRE ATLAS terms, so findings are reported in the vocabulary security and compliance teams already use.
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References · 7
- 2015Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognitioncited by 52,096
- 2017BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chaincited by 1,106
- 2021MedMNIST v2 -- A large-scale lightweight benchmark for 2D and 3D biomedical image classificationcited by 690
- 2018Spectral Signatures in Backdoor Attackscited by 484
- 2018Detecting Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks by Activation Clusteringcited by 456
- 2021FIBA: Frequency-Injection based Backdoor Attack in Medical Image Analysiscited by 61
- 2025Data Poisoning Vulnerabilities Across Healthcare AI Architectures: A Security Threat Analysiscited by 3
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- 2024Countering Backdoor Attacks in Image Recognition: A Survey and Evaluation of Mitigation Strategies
- 2022Backdoor Attack is a Devil in Federated GAN-based Medical Image Synthesis
- 2023Activation Gradient based Poisoned Sample Detection Against Backdoor Attacks