mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Architecting the Secure AI-SOC: A Neurosymbolic Framework for Pipeline Integrity and Threat Mitigation

arXiv 2609.10707 ↗First posted 9 Sep 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Security Operations Centers (SOCs) streamlines threat intelligence but introduces critical vulnerabilities, notably indirect prompt injection via log poisoning. Adversaries exploit this vector to execute multistep ``promptware'' kill chains by embedding malicious payloads within system logs to hijack the LLM's operational logic. Securing this pipeline presents a dichotomy: deterministic defenses are computationally efficient yet semantically blind, while purely neural evaluations introduce prohibitive latency and probabilistic flaws. To address this, we propose a novel neurosymbolic defense-in-depth architecture that ensures end-to-end pipeline integrity. The primary layer employs customized SIEM decoders as a deterministic pre-filter, performing immediate structural sanitization to neutralize volumetric padding and signature-based injections at the ingestion edge. The secondary layer leverages NeMo Guardrails to enforce strict semantic boundaries through self-checking validation on the structured SIEM alerts prior to LLM processing. Furthermore, the framework integrates a closed-loop telemetry system, providing critical Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) visibility into thwarted attacks directly within the SOC dashboard. We present a comprehensive experimental evaluation mapped to the MITRE ATLAS taxonomy, assessing the framework against diverse prompt injections. Our results demonstrate that this synergistic approach effectively dismantles the promptware kill chain - bounding LLM stochasticity with verifiable constraints, and delivering a resilient, highly observable defense mechanism for next-generation AI-SOCs.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 12 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Sep 2026.

Builds on

12 of 32 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026The Promptware Kill Chain: How Prompt Injections Gradually Evolved Into a Multistep Malware Delivery Mechanism14 Jan
  2. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions19 Apr
  3. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries9 Feb
  4. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb

Other references · 8

  1. 2023Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Modelscited by 608
  2. 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 434
  3. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 347
  4. 2023Exploiting Programmatic Behavior of LLMs: Dual-Use Through Standard Security Attackscited by 268
  5. 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systemscited by 118
  6. 2024Fight Back Against Jailbreaking via Prompt Adversarial Tuningcited by 63
  7. 2025ACE: A Security Architecture for LLM-Integrated App Systemscited by 52
  8. 2025AgentSentinel: An End-to-End and Real-Time Security Defense Framework for Computer-Use Agentscited by 25

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