mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

LLM Forensics: Where Do Backdoors Hide? Localizing and Controlling Trigger Mechanisms with Sparse Autoencoders

arXiv 2609.07746 ↗First posted 7 Sep 2026cs.CLcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks

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Abstract (arXiv)

Even though backdoors in LLMs have been a growing concern, their inner workings are still under heavy scrutiny. Trigger-based backdoors are easy to define behaviorally, a rare input that makes the model switch to a chosen response pattern, but the mechanism between triggers and their responses is less clear. We study this mechanism in a controlled, harmless language-switching setting, where fixed trigger sequences make 1B and 8B language models continue English prompts in French or German. For this, we train sparse autoencoders (SAEs) across layers and transformer components, then compare triggered prompts with translation and pretraining controls to identify trigger-relevant feature directions. We show how SAE features separate triggered prompts from controls with near-perfect F1, but features that detect the trigger do not necessarily control the behavior. In intervention tests, attention and MLP features often fire reliably on triggered prompts, making them good detectors, but ablating them rarely suppresses the language switch and activating them rarely induces it. In contrast, residual-stream features can suppress triggered generation when ablated, and some selected features can induce target-language continuations without the trigger. In short, these token-trigger mechanisms decompose into distinct SAE feature directions, with separate features for trigger detection, residual-stream propagation, and later language tracking. This role-level decomposition is the part most likely to transfer to other trigger-based backdoors, even when the payload, layers, or circuit locations differ.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 30 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 7 Sep 2026.

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30 of 35 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Language-Switching Triggers Take a Latent Detour Through Language Models18 May
  2. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training10 Jan
  3. 2023Backdoor Attacks for In-Context Learning with Language Models27 Jul

Other references · 27

  1. 2022Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPTcited by 2,691
  2. 2023Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Modelscited by 1,420
  3. 2016Understanding intermediate layers using linear classifier probescited by 1,353
  4. 2022Interpretability in the Wild: a Circuit for Indirect Object Identification in GPT-2 smallcited by 1,165
  5. 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!cited by 1,154
  6. 2017BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chaincited by 1,106
  7. 2016Bag of Tricks for Efficient Text Classificationcited by 876
  8. 2021Probing Classifiers: Promises, Shortcomings, and Advancescited by 876
  9. 2023Towards Automated Circuit Discovery for Mechanistic Interpretabilitycited by 724
  10. 2018Fine-Pruning: Defending Against Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networkscited by 580
  11. 2023Dissecting Recall of Factual Associations in Auto-Regressive Language Modelscited by 528
  12. 2018Spectral Signatures in Backdoor Attackscited by 484
15 more
  1. 2018Detecting Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks by Activation Clusteringcited by 456
  2. 2024Sparse Feature Circuits: Discovering and Editing Interpretable Causal Graphs in Language Modelscited by 435
  3. 2024Gemma Scope: Open Sparse Autoencoders Everywhere All At Once on Gemma 2cited by 394
  4. 2016FastText.zip: Compressing text classification modelscited by 335
  5. 2024Jumping Ahead: Improving Reconstruction Fidelity with JumpReLU Sparse Autoencoderscited by 300
  6. 2024Do Llamas Work in English? On the Latent Language of Multilingual Transformerscited by 281
  7. 2023Poisoning Language Models During Instruction Tuningcited by 269
  8. 2020BadNL: Backdoor Attacks against NLP Models with Semantic-preserving Improvementscited by 211
  9. 2023Localizing Model Behavior with Path Patchingcited by 195
  10. 2025Learning Multi-Level Features with Matryoshka Sparse Autoencoderscited by 143
  11. 2024AtP*: An efficient and scalable method for localizing LLM behaviour to componentscited by 111
  12. 2025SAEs Are Good for Steering -- If You Select the Right Featurescited by 78
  13. 2025Thought Crime: Backdoors and Emergent Misalignment in Reasoning Modelscited by 65
  14. 2025Ultra-FineWeb: Efficient Data Filtering and Verification for High-Quality LLM Training Datacited by 38
  15. 2025Gaperon: A Peppered English-French Generative Language Model Suitecited by 9

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  3. 2026Why Are LLM Backdoor Defenses Fragmented? A Feature-Level Explanation with Sparse Autoencoders
  4. 2026Language Triggers Hijack Language Circuits: A Mechanistic Analysis of Backdoor Behaviors in Large Language Models
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  6. 2025From Poisoned to Aware: Fostering Backdoor Self-Awareness in LLMs
  7. 2026Backdoor Unlearning Generalization: A Path Toward the Removal of Unknown Triggers in LLMs
  8. 2026Dummy Backdoor as a Defense: Removing Unknown Backdoors via Shared Internal Mechanisms for Generative LLMs