Necessary or Sufficient? Evaluating LLM Explanations With Behavioural Evidence
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Abstract (arXiv)
LLM decision components that can operate within agent workflows often produce action-relevant recommendations or judgements together with explanations. Operators may use the named factors to monitor a system, diagnose errors, or decide when to escalate an output. Such use assumes that the explanations agree with the component's observable decision behaviour. We test two interpretations of the named factors: necessity, meaning that changing a factor would change the output, and sufficiency, meaning that retaining it while removing other changeable information would preserve the output. We evaluate these interpretations in two synthetic use cases: recommending advisors to clients and judging prompts for harmfulness or risk. Models return an output and the top three factors that most influenced it. Controlled black-box interventions estimate a necessity score for each factor by measuring how often changing it changes the output, and a sufficiency score by measuring how often retaining it preserves the output. Across eight models from the Claude, GPT, and Gemini families, the mean Spearman correlations between the cited ranking and the necessity and sufficiency scores are 0.349 and 0.354 for advisor recommendation, and 0.431 and 0.580 for prompt monitoring. Furthermore, an uncited factor scores above the lowest-scoring cited factor in 57.6% of advisor responses under necessity and 58.1% under sufficiency; the corresponding prompt-monitoring rates are 25.8% and 8.9%. The cited top three contain useful information but do not reliably identify the three factors with the strongest measured influence under necessity or sufficiency. The framework provides a black-box reliability check for explanations used in agent oversight while remaining scoped to individual LLM decisions.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 14 of its 16 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Sep 2026.
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References · 14
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2023Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Promptingcited by 1,122
- 2023Quantifying Language Models' Sensitivity to Spurious Features in Prompt Design or: How I learned to start worrying about prompt formattingcited by 817
- 2023Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoningcited by 703
- 2023State of What Art? A Call for Multi-Prompt LLM Evaluationcited by 310
- 2024ProSA: Assessing and Understanding the Prompt Sensitivity of LLMscited by 149
- 2023Large Language Models Understand and Can be Enhanced by Emotional Stimulicited by 146
- 2013Probabilities of Causation: Bounds and Identificationcited by 90
- 2022Personalized Prompt Learning for Explainable Recommendationcited by 79
- 2021Counterfactual Explainable Recommendationcited by 60
- 2019PRINCE: Provider-side Interpretability with Counterfactual Explanations in Recommender Systemscited by 35
- 2024XRec: Large Language Models for Explainable Recommendationcited by 35
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