mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

The Latent Diagnostic Taxonomy: A Framework for Constructing Classifiers and Diagnosing Their Decisions, Applied to Prompt Injection Detection

arXiv 2608.26423 ↗First posted 26 Aug 2026cs.LG cs.AI cs.CLcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

This paper proposes a framework for constructing a classifier as a safeguard layer, and for developing a complementary diagnostic that identifies which of the classifier's confident decisions can be trusted. This framework, the Latent Diagnostic Taxonomy, consists of (i) constructing a dimensionality-optimized classifier, in which the embedding dimensionality is empirically selected via cross-validated performance rather than fixed a priori, (ii) locating a relatively small set of latent support vectors (~ 29% of total training examples) representing influential prompts for identifying tokens that alter the classifier's predicted labels, and (iii) utilizing such tokens and their associated attack magnitudes for constructing a diagnostic taxonomy. This diagnostic taxonomy provides an end-to-end guideline for flagging prompts that require different treatments: rely Safely on the classifier's decision; flag Heuristic Bias and Heuristic Override cases; route Insufficient Context cases for further human/safety review. Applying the framework to a classifier trained on a public prompt injection dataset, we find that a substantial fraction of its confident decisions (~ 77%) are not robust to removing a single token, and that this brittleness separates into two distinct failure patterns: a confidence calibration failure and a genuinely exploitable shortcut. For each zone of the taxonomy, we also recommend strategies for remediating diagnosed prompts. We illustrate the framework as a series of steps, demonstrating how each step operates.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 15 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Aug 2026.

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15 of 20 references.

Closest ancestors · 6

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Simple Prompt Injection Attacks Can Leak Personal Data Observed by LLM Agents During Task Execution1 Jun
  2. 2024Enhancing Prompt Injection Attacks to LLMs via Poisoning Alignment18 Oct
  3. 2023Tensor Trust: Interpretable Prompt Injection Attacks from an Online Game2 Nov
  4. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses19 Oct
  5. 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications8 Jun
  6. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb

Other references · 9

  1. 2022Text Embeddings by Weakly-Supervised Contrastive Pre-trainingcited by 1,216
  2. 2022Decomposed Prompting: A Modular Approach for Solving Complex Taskscited by 554
  3. 2025Agentic Context Engineering: Evolving Contexts for Self-Improving Language Modelscited by 349
  4. 2024ScribeAgent: Towards Specialized Web Agents Using Production-Scale Workflow Datacited by 39
  5. 2024SPML: A DSL for Defending Language Models Against Prompt Attackscited by 33
  6. 2024Prompt Leakage effect and defense strategies for multi-turn LLM interactionscited by 23
  7. 2013Word Emdeddings through Hellinger PCAcited by 10
  8. 2019Single Training Dimension Selection for Word Embedding with PCAcited by 9
  9. 2026The Embedder's Dilemma: LLMs Are Better, but at What Cost?cited by 4

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