PROVE: Training-Free Prompt Recovery using Verifiable Evidence
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Modern text-to-image models can generate highly realistic images from natural-language prompts, while recent advances in prompt inversion have made it increasingly feasible to recover those prompts from generated outputs, raising new concerns for copyright protection and content ownership. As prompt marketplaces emerge, recovered prompts can enable both the unauthorized reproduction and redistribution of copyrighted creative works, and the exposure of the prompts that encode an artist's creative recipe in AI-generated content. Existing prompt inversion methods rely on gradient-based optimization, autoregressive captioning, or reinforcement learning. However, optimization-based methods often produce unreadable prompts, captioning methods hallucinate unverified details, and RL-based approaches frequently overfit to specific generators while introducing evaluation circularity. We introduce PROVE (Prompt Recovery with Verified Evidence), a training-free, black-box prompt inversion attack that reconstructs prompts by composing verifiable scene descriptions rather than optimizing token sequences, targeting both original copyrighted works and AI-generated content. The resulting prompts are fully auditable, with every recovered claim grounded in explicit image evidence, and are formalized through a precision-constrained recall maximization objective. Across MS-COCO, Flickr30K, and Lexica, using state-of-the-art text-to-image generators, PROVE consistently outperforms optimization, captioning, and RL-based baselines on image similarity (DINO, LPIPS) and text-image alignment (CLIP), without any training, generator access, or fine-tuning, demonstrating a stronger and more practical prompt inversion attack.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 20 of its 25 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Aug 2026.
Builds on
20 of 25 references.
References · 20
- 2014Microsoft COCO: Common Objects in Contextcited by 17,498
- 2022Photorealistic Text-to-Image Diffusion Models with Deep Language Understandingcited by 6,322
- 2021Zero-Shot Text-to-Image Generationcited by 4,276
- 2024Scaling Rectified Flow Transformers for High-Resolution Image Synthesiscited by 4,094
- 2022An Image is Worth One Word: Personalizing Text-to-Image Generation using Textual Inversioncited by 2,231
- 2015Flickr30k Entities: Collecting Region-to-Phrase Correspondences for Richer Image-to-Sentence Modelscited by 1,352
- 2022Multi-Concept Customization of Text-to-Image Diffusioncited by 1,099
- 2023Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Modelscited by 723
- 2022When and why vision-language models behave like bags-of-words, and what to do about it?cited by 603
- 2022Diffusion Art or Digital Forgery? Investigating Data Replication in Diffusion Modelscited by 418
- 2023Hard Prompts Made Easy: Gradient-Based Discrete Optimization for Prompt Tuning and Discoverycited by 329
- 2024Long-CLIP: Unlocking the Long-Text Capability of CLIPcited by 298
8 more
- 2023Negative-prompt Inversion: Fast Image Inversion for Editing with Text-guided Diffusion Modelscited by 172
- 2023A Picture is Worth More Than 77 Text Tokens: Evaluating CLIP-Style Models on Dense Captionscited by 107
- 2022Membership Inference Attacks Against Text-to-image Generation Modelscited by 66
- 2023Prompt Stealing Attacks Against Text-to-Image Generation Modelscited by 48
- 2024Shake to Leak: Fine-tuning Diffusion Models Can Amplify the Generative Privacy Riskcited by 17
- 2025Visually Guided Decoding: Gradient-Free Hard Prompt Inversion with Language Modelscited by 10
- 2024Prompt Recovery for Image Generation Models: A Comparative Study of Discrete Optimizerscited by 5
- 2025PROMPTMINER: Black-Box Prompt Stealing against Text-to-Image Generative Models via Reinforcement Learning and Fuzz Optimizationcited by 2
Built on by
Not cited yet.