mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

AI Guardrail Survival under Single-Cycle Agentic Self-Summarization

arXiv 2608.11392 ↗First posted 11 Aug 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

Long-running agents periodically compact their context, replacing the transcript with a model-generated summary. Recent work shows that dropping a standing safety constraint during compaction drives behavioral violations across many models (Governance Decay; Chen, 2026). We ask a finer question: under a single compaction cycle, how is a safety rule lost, and what does that imply for detection and evaluation? Our central finding is that a presence check is not a safety check: when compaction does not drop a rule outright, it often leaves something that looks like a rule but does not act like one. On behavioral replay, a degraded residue leads the model to perform the prohibited action far more often than an intact welded rule does (all-case gaps of +34 and +57 points under two replay models, both positive), category-level survival behaves like a residue, and even intact rules sometimes fail to fire, so an audit that checks only textual presence gives false assurance. Sharpening this, rule-form items are retained substantially more often than prominence-matched facts, which is exactly why presence-based checking feels adequate even though survival is not protection. Textual loss is regime-dependent (weld-or-drop with a single rule; degraded predicate-loss residues under a tighter budget), and we did not observe the hypothesized textual severing mode. Such loss is silent at runtime and detectable only by comparison with retained external ground truth (such as a constraint registry), which reveals textual absence but not whether a surviving rule still fires. We also document evaluation pitfalls where LLM-judge labels alone would have reversed a conclusion. All results concern a single compaction cycle.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 6 of its 8 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Aug 2026.

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6 of 8 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Omission Constraints Decay While Commission Constraints Persist in Long-Context LLM Agents22 Apr
  2. 2025Enforcing Temporal Constraints for LLM Agents25 Dec
  3. 2025When Refusals Fail: Unstable Safety Mechanisms in Long-Context LLM Agents2 Dec

Other references · 3

  1. 2025ACON: Optimizing Context Compression for Long-horizon LLM Agentscited by 136
  2. 2026Noisy but Valid: Robust Statistical Evaluation of LLMs with Imperfect Judgescited by 24
  3. 2025Evaluating the Sensitivity of LLMs to Prior Contextcited by 9

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  1. 2026The Compaction Cliff in Long-Running AI Agent Memory
  2. 2026Governance Decay: How Context Compaction Silently Erases Safety Constraints in Long-Horizon LLM Agents
  3. 2026Agent Safety From Within: Detecting Harmful Trajectories from LLM Internal States
  4. 2026Organising Trajectory Evidence for Language-Model Agent Assurance: Fragments, Methods, and the Residual
  5. 2026What Can Be Enforced? A Theory of Certified Runtime Safety for Tool-Using Agents
  6. 2026SafetyDrift: Predicting When AI Agents Cross the Line Before They Actually Do
  7. 2026A GHOST in Long-Horizon Agents: Governance Hazard from Overlooked Safety Constraints across Turns
  8. 2026Safety Does Not Compose: Non-Decaying Loop State for Autonomous LLM Agents